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Based on a series of interviews in Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates, we conduct a 
comprehensive exploratory study of Islamic Venture Capital focusing on the distinguishing 
features of its financial rights and securities and the context which affect their design. We use a 
qualitative methodology, the Grounded Theory approach, to generate new theory. 
We find that while Islamic contractual rights and securities may have formal differences with their 
conventional1 counterparts, they are very close in economic substance. This form-substance 
dichotomy is a central characteristic of Islamic Venture Capital. Market demand for an Islamic 
brand of venture capital based on ideals of fairness and solidarity clashes with the reality of an 
array of agency issues and claims venture capitalists need to address. The capacity of Islamic 
venture capitalists to address these conflicting forces increases with their experience. Their ability 
is, however, constrained by their fiscal and legal environments. In form, commitment to Islamic 
ideals is therefore signaled through an investment policy excluding a small number of industries 
and through the use of Islamic financial instruments with little economic difference, if any, with 
their conventional counterparts. Minor economic inefficiencies can result, although overall, they 
are insignificant. In substance, Islamic Venture Capital is thus operationally and economically a 
near-equivalent to conventional venture capital.  
                                                          
1 In the context of this thesis, conventional finance refers to the predominant practice of finance around the world. It 
is the model of finance most known in Western countries. Islamic finance by contrast is a model of finance that claims 
to be distinctly rooted in the prescriptions of Islam. Conventional finance is still the dominant model in Muslim majority 
countries as well. Islamic finance however is a rapidly growing mode of finance.  
  
Following our analysis of the interviews, we position our theoretical contribution within related 
literature through an extensive survey. To further support our theory of form-substance 
dichotomy, that is the process by which the difference in form is maintained, but not in economic 
substance, we demonstrate the near-equivalence of Islamic financial instruments’ economic 
substance with their conventional counterparts’ through a systematic comparison of economic 
payouts for the entire Islamic venture capital asset class. 
This research is unique in that it is the first to our knowledge to address the topic of financial 
contracting in Islamic venture capital. Previous research in Islamic finance is heavily normative, 
and there is generally a dearth of research publications dealing with either Islamic financial 
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Islamic finance2 has been one of the fastest growing sectors in recent years. It is expected to reach 
a global assets size of 1.8 trillion USD in 2013. Islamic financial markets are not limited to Islamic 
countries and cover a variety of asset classes. Investment banks such as EEIB in London, UK, the 
Global Iman mutual fund, headquartered in Richmond Hill, Ontario, Canada, or private equity and 
venture capital firms such as UIB Capital, based in Chicago, Illinois, USA, are among businesses 
offering Islamic financial services to Western countries. In the same spirit, virtually every major 
financial institution has opened an Islamic window in the Gulf and several other Muslim-majority 
countries. 
Islamic venture capital is still a very recent phenomenon. As Islamic financial services continue to 
expand, the importance of Islamic venture capital is bound to increase. Investors seeking to 
diversify and remain fully compliant with Islamic financial requirements will need Islamic venture 
capital services. The body of research in Islamic finance focused mostly on Islamic financial 
institutions so far. We hope to contribute to the research literature by providing a study in the 
new field of Islamic venture capital and provide detailed insights to professionals interested in it. 
Section 2 of this thesis introduces Islamic finance by presenting its modern genesis and the 
theoretical premises underlying it. Section 3 describes the methodology used in this research. 
Section 4 gives an overview of the venture capital firms we have interviewed. We have protected 
                                                          
2 Islamic finance is the main attempt at implementing the concepts brought by Islamic economics. Islamic economics is 
the set of precepts that seek to create an economy deemed compliant with Islamic laws and traditions by certain 
streams of Islamic thought. See also footnote 1. 
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the identity of our interviewees by replacing their names with codes. Section 5 contains the 
analysis of our data and states our theory. Section 6 positions our theory within the agency 
literature. Section 7 contextualizes our findings within the environment in which they occur, and 
positions the theory within the Islamic financial institutions governance literature. Section 8 
further elaborates on our findings on financial contracting by contrasting them with those in the 
conventional finance literature and proving the near-equivalence between Islamic and 




2. A Background on Islamic Finance 
Boosted by several peaks in oil price since the seventies, conservative Gulf countries have seen 
major increases in their investment capacity as a result of the accumulated cash reserves. Dubai 
in the UAE is among a few cities in the region competing to become financial hubs, with an 
important share of its activities falling under the scope of Islamic Finance (Wilson, 2009). 
In parallel, Malaysia’s pioneering efforts in Islamic finance started as early as 1962. The first 
Islamic institution in the country, the Pilgrims Fund Corporation, known as the Tabung Haji, was 
created as early as 1962. Muslim Malaysians resorted to various traditional means to fund their 
journey to Mecca, including selling their assets. This had a negative impact on their financial 
situation and on the rural economy of the country. As a result, the Tabung Haji was created to 
allow prospective pilgrims to invest savings to pay for their trip (Laldin, 2008). Within the context 
of the New Economic Policy aimed at promoting the upward mobility of the Bumiputera Muslim 
Malays3 following the 1969 race riots4, Malaysia further promoted Islamic finance as a way to 
provide access to financial services to disadvantaged sectors of the population who would 
otherwise choose not to deal with banks. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad and the International 
                                                          
3 The Bumiputera are constitutionally defined as the Muslim Malays in Peninsular Malaysia. In Sabah and Sarawak, the 
definition includes other indigenous groups. Usage blurs the distinction between Bumiputera and Muslim Malays. 
Accordingly, the terms will be used interchangeably in the context of this research. 
4 Descriptive statistics on the income and ownership inequalities among the different ethnic groups composing 
Malaysia, show the Bumiputera being, by far, the most disproportionately impoverished. See for example Rasiah and 
Shari (2001). Those imbalances are thought to be the root cause underlying the 1969 race riots after which the New 
Economic Policy was enacted.  
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Islamic University Malaysia were thus established. Both institutions have been pillars in the 
development of Islamic finance, making the country’s capital Kuala Lumpur another major center 
of the industry (Alfattani, 2008). 
Several other countries enacted policies or regulations promoting the development, or even the 
exclusive use as in the case of Iran, Sudan and Pakistan, of Islamic finance. 
One can sometimes come across statements5 about the Islamic economy and its early successes 
during the first centuries of Islam or the medieval era6. A distinct Islamic economy is a new 
construct however, as economy was never considered a culturally or religiously separate 
endeavor by early Muslims (Kuran, 2004). 
Indeed, Islamic finance finds its roots in Islamic Economy, a socio-political vision having its origins 
in the writings of Abu Ala Mawdudi. Born in India in 1903 during British rule, Mawdudi received a 
mostly traditional primary and secondary education both at home and in traditional religious 
schools. Mawdudi’s views were a reaction both to Western colonialism and to the impending 
threat of Hindu rule when independence was becoming a realistic prospective. Moreover, 
significant sectors among Indian Muslims were economically destitute. The perception of 
existential threats created the need for tightening the community’s bonds. One way to achieve 
this is to create visible differentiating group markers (Iannaccone, 1992). Furthermore, 
perceptions of relative deprivation compared to their own past or to current contemporaries, lead 
to such coping mechanisms as group membership which reduces negative comparisons and 
                                                          
5 See for example Rammal and Zurbruegg (2006), Bashar (1997) and many others. 
6 See Siddiqui (2010) for example. 
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emphasizes moral superiority (Carvalho, 2009). Where Western-educated Muslim elites adopted 
Western-like mores, Abu Ala Mawdudi saw a weakening of the Muslim community. His response 
was thus to promote Islam as a holistic way of life and his focus was directed, among others, at 
economics, given its centrality to everyday life (Kuran, 2004).  
Following the same pattern, Sayyid Qutb, a major figure of the Muslim Brotherhood, was born in 
the early 20th century rural Egypt. After a religious education during childhood, he went to the 
United States between 1948 and 1950. As a dark skinned traditional Egyptian in an America which 
had yet to go through its civil rights movement, he experienced cultural shock. Also, a noteworthy 
influence was the Middle-East’s political context: Israel’s creation and ensuing Arab defeats, the 
Cold War competition for domination by the Soviet Union and the United States in countries with 
very fresh memories of colonialism, and countries ruled by rent-seeking authoritarian secular 
elites. Qutb turned therefore to Al-Mawdudi’s vision and further elaborated on it making 
important contributions to the themes of Islamic Economics notably in his Social Justice in Islam 
(Loboda, 2004). Another founding author of Islamic Economics, mainly on the Shia side, was 
Mohamed Al-Baqir Sadr. Born in 1935, he shared the aforementioned authors’ background, 
growing up in an indigent family in Najaf, Iraq where he received a traditional education. He would 
later be subjected to the persecutions of the Baath party until his execution in 1980. Although he 
was from a different branch of Islam, he adopted the idea of it as an all-inclusive system. One of 
his major books was Our Economy, written between 1960 and 1961, still a major source to date 
for Islamic Banking. A common thread in these sources and perpetuated by later authors, even as 
the ideas gained in sophistication, is the concern for economic justice and fairness. Rejecting the 
constraints of socialism as too burdensome, yet perceiving capitalism as exploitative, profits are 
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legitimate, but only when merited (Kuran, 2004). Interest is one gain considered to be unjust, as 
it is understood to be made without any risk for the lender. 
Thus came what is arguably the greatest central postulate of Islamic finance: the prohibition of 
interest. The religious explanation is found in the interpretation of the Quranic prohibition against 
riba and in restrictions imposed by classical jurisprudence on certain types of monetary exchanges 
of unequal nominal value. Although there is no consensus among scholars on whether riba 
actually means usury or interest, or on the equivalence between interest and usury (Farooq, 
2009)7, proponents of Islamic finance usually favor claims of absolute, unequivocal, injunctions 
against interest. Other notable characteristics of Islamic finance include the prohibition of gharar 
and restrictions on trade in certain kinds of products, such as pork or alcohol. Gharar is a loose 
concept which could be approximated as uncertainty on the object or execution of a contract, 
derived from the hadith, the body of sayings attributed to the Prophet in later centuries.  
By applying restrictions on interests and gharar through a set of normative assumptions 
portraying economic agents as trustworthy socially concerned individuals (e.g. Lewis, 2005), as 
opposed to the neo-classical axioms of rational individuals maximizing personal utility underlying 
conventional economics and finance, the stated purpose in Islamic finance discourse is to enable 
a better distribution of wealth through fair trade. 
                                                          
7 See also El-Gamal (2003) for a full text of an Alazhar fatwa asserting the permissibility of interest. Alazhar is regarded, 
although not without controversy, as the highest authority of Sunni Islam. 
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These assumptions of a sociotropic homo islamicus confronted with the empirically more 
powerful model of homo economicus generate opportunities for severe agency issues to arise8. 
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no previous empirical study has examined how 
agency costs are positively managed from an Islamic finance perspective. Since venture capital is 
both an ideal setting to research agency issues and a stated ideal form of finance for many Islamic 
finance theoreticians, our focus will be on Islamic Venture Capital (IVC) as a counterpart for 
conventional venture capital. We further focus on contracts written by Dubai and Malaysia based 
firms, as the highest amounts of venture capital transactions from member countries of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference are recorded there in the VentureXpert database. 
Moreover, both countries have been actively promoting the development of Islamic finance and 
have formed dedicated institutions and legislation. 
  
                                                          
8 For example, the theoretical prohibition of interest would practically amount to a prohibition of debt. This is reflected 
in the profit-loss sharing ideals of Islamic finance. Under the assumptions of homo economicus, debt has disciplining 
effects on an agent through the threat of bankruptcy and the legal obligation of periodic payments. Under the 
assumptions of homo islamicus, the disciplining effects would come from honesty, faith in the afterlife, and social 
concern by the agent for the investor. Interestingly, the use of murabaha, a debt instrument in economic substance, 




3.1. Description of the Methodology 
We follow the qualitative Grounded Theory (GT) methodology first developed in the 1960s by 
sociologists Glaser and Stauss (1967)9 as applied by Ullah (2012) in the Islamic finance context10.  
Like Ullah (2012), this research doesn’t start with a particular theoretical hypothesis; it rather 
seeks to create a new theoretical framework through a holistic exploratory process. It is only after 
this framework is generated that we then position our findings in the existing literature. 
Ullah (2012) clearly takes a Straussian approach in his analysis. Glaser and Strauss diverged from 
each other since their initial description of the methodology, leading particularly Strauss and 
Corbin to publish several follow up books describing the methodology11, with Glaser vehemently 
disagreeing with the approach (Glaser, 1992). A high-level description of the Straussian approach 
of Grounded Theory recommends proceeding through an iterative cycle that can be broken down 
in three steps: 
1. Open Coding: The minute details of interviews and documents are analyzed and 
conceptualized. Each concept is systematically broken down and described with all its 
                                                          
9 See also Strauss and Corbin (1990); Glaser (1992); Strauss and Corbin (1994) and Corbin and Strauss (2008). 
10 Grounded theory is well established today and used in several studies relating to Islamic finance or Venture Capital. 
As an illustration, see for example Martin and Hunt-Ahmed (2011) in Islamic finance, or Fried and Hisrich (1994), Bruton 
and al. (2002), Mäkelä and Maula (2005) and Ahlstrom (2006) in the area of Venture Capital. 
11 See for example Strauss and Corbin (1990), Strauss and Corbin (1994) and Corbin and Strauss (2008). 
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dimensions. Constant comparison between data being analyzed and concepts already 
found is made to integrate with or add to the existing concepts. 
2. Axial Coding: We link concepts together by examining their dimensions and identifying 
conceptual families. We ensure the organized concept categories will fit alongside the 






Source: Ullah (2012), adapted from Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
The causal conditions are what bring the core phenomenon into existence. Intervening 
conditions are not the direct causes of the core phenomenon, but they shape it by adding 
constraints. The context also has an influence. Although not a cause of the phenomenon, 
the exact mapping of the phenomenon is best understood by distinguishing its contextual 
factors from its causes. The interactional strategies are how the different actors deal with 
the issues at hand. The consequences are the overall picture resulting from the 
combination of all these different elements. 
3. Selective Coding: This is the stage where a core theory is abstracted from the integration 














Although the three steps are presented sequentially for reading convenience in this study, the 
research is actually conducted iteratively as mentioned above, with the three stages often 
executed in parallel and blending. Each iteration either resulted in new concepts or linked to old 
ones through constant comparison. The process was repeated until the generated set stabilized 
and a final theoretical framework could be articulated. The process started as soon as data 
collection started. 
Trying to look at the specificities of Islamic venture capital, the broad question of how it was 
different from conventional venture capital came up.  To try to understand the phenomenon, 
several books and articles were read, both about Islamic finance and about venture capital. Ullah 
(2012) was considered a valid template for this thesis. We then conducted interviews to collect 
data and information about the scarcely documented field of Islamic Venture Capital. Although 
limited by the practical amount of time and resources available to complete we did reach a 
moment where new data was not bringing new codes. We felt comfortable considering at that 
point that we reached theoretical saturation. 
3.1.1. Data Collection 
Our data collection consisted in a set of field interviews and case studies which were conducted 
in both Kuala Lumpur and Dubai, further completed by follow up email exchanges and phone calls. 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with both conventional and Islamic venture capitalists 
in both cities. Interviews were transcribed and manually analyzed sentence by sentence or word 
by word, trying to extract concepts expressed, whether explicitly, or implicitly, by interviewees. 
To better understand the context in which they operate, and to obtain comparative references 
where relevant, we also interviewed a wide array of stakeholders, ranging from Islamic finance 
regulators and lawyers, to sharia and investment experts in retail and investment Islamic banks. 
11 
 
The guidelines established for the interviews are provided in Appendix 10. Questions from those 
guidelines were not necessarily all asked and were not equally treated in time allocation, as the 
profile of our interlocutors, the context and the flow of their ideas were important in determining 
relevance.  The process of data collection lasted for two months and took place first in Kuala 
Lumpur, then Dubai. The analysis started with the first interviews, and took a total of five months. 
It thus was completed three months after the last interviews. Moreover, the analysis was 
conducted for all interviews, including those which were conducted with the actors mentioned 
above who are not directly working in a venture capital firm, but in a related are, such as 
legislators, sources of sharia authority, or other market actors. Different interviewees had varying 
degrees of availability. With the individuals with whom we were allotted less time, interviews 
were very focused on all or part of the questionnaire reproduced in section 10 Appendix: 
Interview Guideline. With individuals with whom we were afforded more time, with sessions 
sometimes lasting an entire day, interviews could be much more general, open questions were 
asked and we covered wider topics. These included the general history of Islamic finance in the 
respective countries, personal perceptions of the industry locally or internationally, theological 
topics, individual business questions, and much more. The interview guideline described in 
section 10 Appendix: Interview Guideline was contextually applied consequently. For example, 
technical questions about security design and agency issues management were unlikely to be of 
concern for Sharia scholars. Information collected was also crossed in some cases. As an 
illustration, compensation for sharia scholars quoted by interviewees was crossed with other 
studies such as Farook and Farooq (2011), noting that Glaser (1992) considers that existing 
literature can be used as data. 
12 
 
3.1.2. Open Coding 
In conducting interviews and analyzing data, we had to be theoretically sensitive: codes were 
extracted from existing data without preconceived ideas. Concepts were constructed inductively 
from data and embodied in the open codes. During the first two months, those were also tested 
and refined during interviews with different interlocutors. The extracted concepts were written 
down, and were modified when necessary, as new information improved our understanding of 
the concepts. Open codes were broken down into the fine-grained dimensions found in the 
interviews. 
3.1.3.  Axial Coding 
At this stage, open codes are grouped into conceptual families which fit in the paradigm categories 
described above in 3.1. Some open codes could fit in more than one category and a judgment call 
had to be made to see which would be closest. Since this was an iterative process, axial coding 
also provided the opportunity to revisit some of the open coding and verify the relevance of the 
dimensions discovered. 
3.1.4. Selective Coding 
This step is where the core phenomenon is identified and the relationships between the different 
codes are articulated. The concept of dichotomy between form and substance in Islamic venture 
capital was apparent all along, but it emerged progressively as an explicit central concept of this 
thesis. When the core concept was finally identified, theoretical saturation was already achieved, 
as new data did not bring changes to the existing codes. 
13 
 
3.2. Justification for the Methodology 
This research faces similar issues to Ullah (2012)’s study in that it investigates a relatively 
unexplored area with little public data. Indeed, during our extensive review of the existing 
literature, we only came across two books12 written on the area of Islamic venture capital or 
private equity, including one published after the first draft of this thesis was completed. Both are 
based on case studies, and are essentially general practitioner guides. They do not address agency 
issues, neither from a theoretical nor from a practical point of view. We also identified one 
published article with normative content on how IVC should ideally be practiced13. Additional 
references to venture capital in Islamic finance literature are the recurring broad statements14 in 
normative literature about venture capital being an ideal form of Islamic finance. As a result, there 
is little to base on in terms of building working hypotheses in the area of agency issues in Islamic 
finance, and even less so with a focus on venture capital. This topic area is therefore well suited 
for the use of the grounded theory methodology. The use of this methodology in an under-
researched field like Islamic Venture Capital can facilitate the collection of a first set of data 
through interviews for example, on which subsequent standardized collection and testing of 
hypotheses can be based (Flick et al., 2004). 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) discuss the relevance of qualitative research vs. quantitative research, 
each having their strengths and weaknesses. They describe how, inspired from hard sciences, the 
focus in quantitative approaches has been on “efforts to verify (positivism) or falsify 
                                                          
12 Siddiqui (2010) and Fara (2012). 
13 Choudhury (2001). 
14 See for example Choudhury (2001), Dar and Presley (2000) and many others. 
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(postpositivism) a priori hypotheses, most usefully stated as mathematical (quantitative) 
propositions or propositions that can easily be converted into precise mathematical formulas 
expressing functional relationships”15. This focus, they add, stems from its “enormous utility when 
the aim of science is the prediction and control of natural phenomena”16. Among the different 
critiques they ascribe to quantitative research, the most relevant here is that it excludes the 
dimension of discovery in inquiry. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 106), “conventional 
emphasis on the verification of specific, a priori hypotheses glosses over the source of those 
hypotheses, usually arrived at by what it commonly termed the discovery process. (…) The call for 
qualitative inputs is expected to redress this imbalance”. Moreover, while quantitative research 
focuses on explaining the causes of a given phenomenon, qualitative research emphasizes the 
understanding of the phenomenon (Firestone, 1987). 
In the same line of thought, Gilson and Schizer (2003, p. 878) in their study of tax effects on the 
choice of securities write: 
As a matter of academic craft, our analysis suggests the difficulty of financial modeling 
for activities in which low-visibility, "practice"-level patterns are of first-order significance. 
Unless informed by institutional knowledge deep enough to reveal such patterns, models 
will miss a significant factor that is influencing behavior. 
                                                          




Although Gilson and Schizer (2003)’s study was not based in GT, qualitative GT research can 
partially remedy this weakness. 
Compared with other qualitative methodologies that seek to verify hypotheses established based 
on previous research or understand phenomena for example, Grounded Theory is particularly 
well suited for developing new theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). This new theory may of course 
be subject to follow up empirical validation once appropriate data becomes available. Quoting 
Strauss and Corbin (1990), Ullah (2012, p.47) writes: 
“GT is a scientific method” which meets the criteria of “significance, theory observation 
compatibility, generalizability, reproducibility, precision, rigor and verification”. These 
criteria make the foundation of scientific research methods and hence they classify GT 
methodology as scientific. 
A last note on methodology is about rigor and relevance. This study strives to reduce the trade-
offs between the rigor of academic theory and the relevance to business practitioners. Through 
the use of a recognized qualitative methodology, we find interesting new theories that can form 
the basis for follow-up academic research. Additionally, one point made by Guba and Lincoln 
(1994) is that while the controls and other exclusionary mechanisms in research design used in 
quantitative methodologies add rigor to theory, they reduce transferability by limiting the 
applicability of the findings to specific settings that meet those particular conditions. In other 
words, data is stripped from its context. Qualitative research on the other hand can be more 
directly relevant by keeping the conceptual density given by the context. Myers (2009) also points 
out this gap between relevance and rigor. He explains how qualitative research has the advantage 
16 
 
of addressing organizational questions in all their complexity, including unquantifiable conditions, 
something a business practitioner could more directly identify with. 
3.3. Limitations 
Among the specific methodological limitations of this study is that in three out of the six VC firms, 
only one manager was interviewed. For the three others, two managers or one manager and one 
entrepreneur were interviewed. In each of the three cases, one voice was definitely dominant as 
one of the interviewees provided most of the data. This limitation is mainly due to the time and 
funds available for the research. Ideally, more actors from each of the firms would have been 
interviewed. A mitigating factor however is that in each of these cases, the most senior members 
have been interviewed and most of these firms had a limited number of staff. 
Another limitation is that the audit trail was informally applied. The electronic documents were 






4. Overview of Cases 
To the best of our knowledge, Kuala Lumpur only has three Islamic Venture Capital (IVC) firms: 
We met with the Malaysian Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, which provided us 
with the complete directory of registered Malaysian Venture Capital firms, and we completed the 
list by inquiring with our interviewees. Three venture capital firms are registered with the 
Malaysian Securities Commission as being Islamic, although one is defunct. One of the two 
officially registered active IVC firms is MalaysiaBankIVC, which is the venture capital arm of a 
major Islamic bank in Malaysia. MalaysiaIIVC is the second active IVC firm. We interviewed the 
managers of both these firms. We also interviewed the head of MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC’s asset 
management unit. Although not registered as an IVC firm with the Malaysian Securities 
Commission, it is the venture capital and private equity arm of the Islamic window of a major 
regional Malaysian bank, registered at the Central Bank of Malaysia with more stringent sharia 
compliance requirements. In addition to these firms, we interviewed a wide range of stakeholders 
and related actors, including directors at MalaysiaCVC, a major conventional venture capital firm 
in Malaysia. We will first describe this firm as a reference point for the previously mentioned 
Islamic firms. We met lawyers specialized in Malaysian IVC and legislators from the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB)17 or the Central Bank of Malaysia, as well as the heads of Sharia of 
several Islamic banks for the purpose of understanding the specific context of Islamic finance in 
Malaysia. We will limit the case descriptions to the venture capital firms as they are the ones most 
directly related to our research. 
                                                          
17 See section 7.2.1. 
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Dubai also has three IVC firms to the best of our knowledge. We have succeeded in obtaining an 
interview in one of them, DubaiIVCHolding. A Dubai conventional venture capital firm we have 
met and which we will describe in the following section for comparative purposes as well is 
DubaiCVC. In addition to these we also met with heads of Sharia departments of Islamic banks as 
well as investment bankers, including major private equity actors, in Dubai. As in the case of 
Malaysia, the objective was to frame our research in its general context of Dubai and we will only 
describe cases of venture capital firms. 
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MalaysiaCVC is a large conventional venture capital firm created in 2001, with an investment 
preference for the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sector. It manages assets 
totaling over 300 million US dollars (1 billion Malaysian Ringgits). At least one of its funds has a 
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Bumiputera mandate requiring investments to have 51% Bumiputera ownership. Additional 
mandates include the creation of more venture capital talent by acting as a fund of funds with 
professionals with potential to succeed in the venture capital industry. 
MalaysiaCVC has a tax exempt status and ensures its investees, who benefit from favorable tax 
laws for the ICT sector, obtain those privileges as well so tax considerations are usually not 
factored into their financial contracts’ design. 
MalaysiaCVC looks for minority equity stakes. In this context, one of MalaysiaCVC’s vice presidents 
told us: “I don’t see the difference between what we’re doing and what Islamic venture capitalists 
do”. Most investments are made in the form of redeemable convertible preferred shares. Voting 
rights and board rights depend on risk perceptions and negotiations, but no special voting powers 
are sought. Like venture capital investments elsewhere, MalaysiaCVC secures reservation rights 
on major operational changes. Term sheets are customized in house from standard templates, 
although the process takes a while in order to establish a relationship first. In addition to the 
financial terms linked to the investee company itself, a put option is obtained personally from the 
investee’s entrepreneurs, as a deterrent in case things go awry. 
4.2. MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC 
MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC is the Islamic window of a major regional bank owned in majority by 
non-Muslim Chinese capital. Its asset management arm includes private equity and venture 
capital funds, with an Asian regional focus. Projects financed by these funds at the regional level 
include ICT, the food industry, and major infrastructure projects with the size of individual 




In addition to the required sharia research department, six reputable Sharia scholars from diverse 
backgrounds sit on MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC’s Sharia Committee, reflecting its international 
presence. Four votes out of six are needed for decisions, ensuring a qualified majority for 
compliance. MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC’s private equity and venture capital funds leverage the 
sharia units of the bank. Moreover, activities are covered by investment guidelines which include 
sharia compliance rules. Deal sourcing, for example, according to these rules is filtered by the 
fund manager through two sets of criteria, one being the type of business, excluding a certain 
number of industries such as ones dealing with alcohol, the other criteria being the investee’s 
financials, with restrictions notably on debt ratios among others. Term sheets are then negotiated 
and submitted for approval by both the Investment Committee and the Sharia Committee. Our 
interviewee noted a learning effect on what the sharia scholars would approve or not. More 
experience and learning, according to him, led to greater acceptance of conventional financial 
instruments as Islamic. At the portfolio management stage, fund managers monitor sharia 
compliance monthly and at least one quarterly report for Limited Partner (LP) consumption is 
issued showing that the investment is still sharia compliant. The Sharia Committee has the power 
to force an exit in cases of noncompliance. 
Instruments used in MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC’s venture capital transactions include ordinary 
shares, through capital increase or shares acquisition, or a combination of both. In the case of 
ordinary shares, shares can be of the same class as those currently outstanding or a different one, 
Malaysian sharia scholars accept the existence of different classes of shares, contingent upon a 
pro-rata distribution of profits. Although sharia scholars usually reject preferred shares, they 
allow certain shareholders to waive their voting rights through the shareholders’ agreement, thus 
mimicking the economic behavior of non-cumulative preferred shares. Convertibility features are 
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normally included as well, based notably on the concepts of wa’ad18, urbun or salam19 depending 
on tax efficiency, economic viability, IRR targets and risk factors among others. 
Mezzanine financing, a type of financing conventionally based on debt with rights to equity used 
to supplement capital mostly in real estate and private equity transactions, has also relied on 
murabaha, whose economic behavior is equivalent to debt20. Musharaka and mudaraba, equity 
based instruments, have been used but they involve a legal and fiscal risk outside of Malaysia due 
to the uncertainty of legal interpretations around these structures. Their use has therefore been 
limited in cross-border transactions where the bank reverts to the safety of more familiar 
instruments such as murabaha. Equity kickers21 could be used and are designed in separate 
financial agreements as incentives contingent on performance. 
Generally, the accounting and fiscal treatments of these instruments is of particular concern in 
cross border transactions, where regulation and jurisprudence is different or less established than 
Malaysia and requires the intervention of accounting and tax specialists. Examples of jurisdiction 
dependent design include amortization vs. assuming upfront profit rates on murabaha 
transactions, economically equivalent to the interest rates on debt transactions in conventional 
                                                          
18 The wa’ad is a unilateral promise, binding upon certain formal conditions. 
19 See section 8.2.6 for a description of these. 
20 See section 8.2.1 on straight debt. 
21 Warrants are deemed legitimate by the Sharia Advisory Council of the Malaysian Securities Commission. See 
Securities Commissions of Malaysia, 2007, pp. 60-63. 
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finance. Other considerations include consumption taxes like GST or VAT for ijara transactions – 
economically equivalent to lease-back transactions – or property taxes. 
Financial rights acquired are very similar to those obtained in conventional venture capital22. 
Differences include the absence of redemption rights or special voting rights. Like MALAYSIACVC, 
MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC secures put options from the entrepreneurs in venture capital deals, 
although they have to abide by the wa’ad or urbun principles in the put options agreements. Legal 
fees and expenses during the due diligence process are not covered by the investee. Break-up 
fees, when the investee walks out of a deal, have to be invoiced at actual tangible cost. Flat fee 
penalties and opportunity costs have to be excluded from break-up fees as they are perceived as 
unfairly benefiting from a non-deal by sharia experts23. 
4.3. MalaysiaBankIVC 
MalaysiaBankIVC is a subsidiary corporation of one of the pioneering Islamic bank of Malaysia. 
MalaysiaBankIVC was established in 2010 and is funded entirely by its parent bank. 
Much of MalaysiaBankIVC’s portfolio management processes are undocumented or informally 
applied, reflecting the firm’s youth. Screening of potential investees is done through financial 
parameters with no sharia criteria. Following the Investment Committee’s approval, a report is 
submitted to the Sharia Committee for approval. The Sharia Committee of MalaysiaBankIVC is its 
                                                          
22 See appendix 10.2 for a list of financial rights commonly used in venture capital deals. 
23 Ta`widh and gharama, or compensations and penalties are still topics of debates among sharia scholars. So far, some 
resolutions only have been issued rendering them permissible subject to strict conditions in case of default in a limited 
set of standard debt contracts or judgment debts. See Central Bank of Malaysia, 2010, pp. 129-134. 
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parent bank’s Sharia Committee. Once approved, all other activities, from due diligence to exit, 
go without active sharia supervision. It is the responsibility of the fund manager to anticipate any 
potential sharia violation and report it to the Sharia Committee. 
MalaysiaBankIVC has used straight equity in all of its deals thus far, considering preferred shares 
not to be legitimate from a sharia point of view. No debt was used as per its only fund’s investment 
policy. A gentlemen’s understanding between the fund and the investees is sought for the regular 
distribution of dividends. MalaysiaBankIVC’s managers insist on creating a quality personal 
relationship with the entrepreneurs. The most important factor that distinguishes them as a 
sharia compliant firm, according to one of the managers, is the manners and trust with which they 
deal with their investees, whom they want to consider as equal partners. As such, no controlling 
stake is necessarily sought when investing. Many contractual rights common in the venture capital 
industry were not initially sought either, but this appears to reflect the learning curve rather than 
a sharia preference: attitudes are evolving in the face of some “close calls” as one of the managers 
put it. One example involves a company whose managers walked away for other jobs as soon as 
the investment was obtained. As a result, MalaysiaBankIVC indicates it doesn’t see any issue with 
requiring any of the usual venture capital rights today, and have already done so for most of the 
rights listed in Appendix 10.2. It is also considering an individual put option requirement for 
financed entrepreneurs as is required by other venture capital firms we’ve met in Kuala Lumpur. 
Additionally, MalaysiaBankIVC is preparing a new fund with more sophisticated securities than 
straight equity, although their precise nature is yet to be determined at the time of this writing. 
4.4. MalaysiaIIVC 
MalaysiaIIVC is an independent sharia compliant venture capital firm in Kuala Lumpur. It was 
founded in 2007 by an ex-manager at one of the major Islamic banks in the country, who had 
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identified a new sector where Islamic financial services could be expanded, and raised then its 
first fund from MalaysiaCVC, focusing on technology companies. Its fund’s size is 35 million 
Malaysian Ringgit, or about ten million dollars. MalaysiaIIVC is currently raising a second fund of 
the same size from Tabung Haji, Malaysia’s pilgrims’ fund. 
MalaysiaIIVC’ Sharia Committee is composed of one scholar, as per the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia’s requirements for registered Islamic venture capital firms. After an initial screening with 
some basic due diligence process looking at a potential investee’s business plan and financials, 
the Sharia Committee intervenes. It ensures the financial structure of the target company has no 
more than 10% of its assets in interest bearing accounts, that its term sheet, its industry and 
products are acceptable from a sharia standpoint. The Investment Committee only looks at deals 
already approved by the Sharia Committee. Each quarter, a directors meeting with the Investment 
Committee includes checks on sharia compliance in ongoing investments. If an exit happens 
through an acquisition, then the acquirer must be, at least, from an industry that is legitimate 
from a sharia point of view. 
MalaysiaIIVC’s fund managers are quite pragmatic about their investments. They expect agency 
issues to arise and try to address them proactively, although there is a learning element relative 
to contractual rights and financial instruments. Interestingly, most of the rights we mentioned 
during our interview which weren’t already part of their usual terms triggered immense interest 
for future use, revealing that their absence was due to lack of exposure rather than sharia driven 
restraint. Others, like liquidation preferences or pay-to-play rights for example were seen as 
inconsistent with their use of Murabaha Redeemable Convertible Instruments (MRCI). 
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The MRCI is a security invented by MalaysiaIIVC. As its name indicates, it is based on murabaha, 
or trade based debt, with an option of conversion to common shares and a redemption feature. 
The conversion feature has been approved by the Sharia Committee on the condition that the 
conversion ratio is agreed upfront. Moreover, MRCI was designed to mimic more closely the 
behavior of convertible redeemable preferred equity rather than debt. Although it does not 
contractually entitle MalaysiaIIVC to dividend distributions since preferred equity is deemed 
illegitimate from a sharia perspective, there is an implicit understanding that MalaysiaIIVC will 
receive a share of any dividend distribution as a gift. This expectation affects perceptions about 
the fairness of the relationship and many indirect contractual tools are available to ensure this 
implicit clause is abided by, including the possibility of discontinuing the relationship24. 
Like in much of the Islamic finance industry, investments in intangible assets are considered illicit 
by MalaysiaIIVC’ Sharia Committee. The prohibition includes investments in research and 
development. A target company interested in such an investment works around the prohibition 
by an economically similar operation of raising Islamic venture capital to be placed in real estate 
assets, then requesting an overdraft from a third party bank collateralized by those. Although no 
case of default happened so far, MalaysiaIIVC assumes that such a third party bank would be likely 
to gain seniority of claims on the assets in such circumstances. 
                                                          
24 Although in states of the world where the relationship between MalaysiaIIVC and the investee is fine, the MRCI is 
indeed an economic equivalent to convertible redeemable preferred, it reverts to being an economic equivalent to 
convertible redeemable debt in those states where the investee can afford bearing the cost, if any, of degrading that 
relationship by not sharing dividends. 
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Other tools used by MalaysiaIIVC similar to other Islamic as well conventional firms include for 
example securing an individual put option from the entrepreneurs at investment time as a 
deterrent against misbehavior. Also, like other Islamic firms, MalaysiaIIVC ensures continuous 
sharia compliance of its portfolio firms in terms of industry through its reservation rights. Unlike 
MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC, legal fees and expenses are born by the investee firm if the deal is 
closed. If the deal is called off by MalaysiaIIVC, the Sharia Committee requires that it bears the 
costs. If the deal is called off by the target firm, the Sharia Committee limits MalaysiaIIVC’ right to 
reimbursement to third party costs, although this could evolve and include time spent. 
Finally, and unlike some other Islamic financial firms or institutions we’ve met, valuation was not 
considered within the scope of sharia scrutiny. Where others would claim that valuation has to 
go through some fairness test, MalaysiaIIVC’ approach is one of contractual freedom. 
4.5. DubaiCVC 
DubaiCVC is a conventional venture capital firm based in Dubai. Like many firms in the region, it 
has an international scope for its investments, including Sub-Saharan Africa, the MENA region, 
South-East Asia, or CIS countries. Unlike many in the region where the preference strongly goes 
to real estate25, the industry focus of DubaiCVC is on the media and technology sectors. 
The region is awash with challenges. A lack of reliable accounting information and information on 
companies, most often family owned, is one of the challenges one could meet. Moreover, limited 
partners may have broad or shifting investment objectives in mind, with attitudes deeply based 
on individual preferences unrelated to financial criteria. As personal relationships are essential to 
                                                          
25 According to our interviewees, there is a “huge stigma against investing in the tech sector”. 
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raising money with the exception of a handful of international high profile exceptions, funds are 
usually created around a set of well identified companies. DubaiCVC follows this line, and 
sometimes even initiates the creation of its portfolio companies after the identification of specific 
niches followed by the identification of related patent holders willing to become entrepreneurs. 
Most decisions made are closely watched by the limited partners as well. Our interviewees felt 
that LP demands could be quite stiff compared to the US, and as money is more concentrated in 
the Middle-East, LP bargaining power tends to be higher. Other local LP idiosyncrasies include the 
attachment to yielding instruments, to the point where they would be willing to pay a premium 
to receive a regular yield over an otherwise financially equivalent investment. 
Term sheets are based on standard templates, used for all geographical areas. Any customization 
would be firm specific as opposed to area specific. However, compared to typical US equivalents, 
term sheets tend to be even less favorable to entrepreneurs. As our interviewees put it: 
“Doomsday scenarios are built-in here in the Middle-East. Entrepreneurs are on a much shorter 
leash than in the US”. Unlike what was invariably seen in Malaysia and closer to US practice, 
DubaiCVC does not demand an individual put option from its entrepreneurs. 
DubaiCVC structures its investments as convertible preferred equity. It includes all rights usually 
found in typical US term sheets. Contracts with the target companies are managed through 
holding structures registered in the Caymans and similar business-friendly countries. Accordingly, 
it is the law of these jurisdictions which is applied. This choice not only reflects the favorable legal 
framework for holding companies in those countries, they also provide a safer choice than local 




DubaiIVCHolding is an investment holding company founded in 2009 with offices in London and 
Dubai. Its geographical scope is international with a preference on major Muslim markets. During 
our interviews with DubaiIVCHolding, two sets of issues related to the Islamic character of the 
firm were separated: the contractual and the spiritual. Contractual behavior was described as “not 
too dissimilar from conventional finance”.  
DubaiIVCHolding uses most of the rights listed in Appendix 10.2. It focuses on mature, preferably 
yielding, companies and further relies on the institutionalization of the organization to mitigate 
many of the agency issues typical of earlier stage investments. As such, like our conventional case 
from Dubai, it doesn’t use the individual put option on entrepreneurs typical of Malaysian venture 
capital. Securities issued are tailored on a case by case basis, being mostly equity based. 
Conventional debt is of course off-limits. Fixed return securities could be issued as long as they 
are sharia compliant, but our interviewees disliked them out of concerns that they violate the 
Islamic finance ideal of sharing risks and take pride in making the entrepreneurs feel they are 
treated fairly. 
DubaiIVCHolding’s in-house sharia advisory is composed of three scholars. They are consulted on 
an ad hoc basis if any concern is identified by one of DubaiIVCHolding’s managers. All sharia 
compliance is driven by internal guidelines established at the DubaiIVCHolding’s creation and 
updated as new issues rose afterwards. Their practical application is left to the discretion of its 
managers. Continuous sharia compliance is guaranteed over the lifecycle of an investment 
through its reservation rights on material changes to the business plan. 
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What DubaiIVCHolding feels really distinguishes it as an Islamic company is the more “spiritual” 
side of its activities. Not only does it avoid potentially contentious industries such as hotels and 
media or ensures the conventional debt of its target companies is converted to Islamic 
instruments, it relies heavily on personal compatibility between the DubaiIVCHolding’s managers 
and the target entrepreneurs. It also relies on the belief, among others, that their faith will drive 
to a higher standard of integrity. Investing in institutionalized, mature, companies, 
DubaiIVCHolding also finds it easier to give more flexibility to target entrepreneurs. This flexibility 
is perceived to be a sign of trust, further reflecting its Islamic spirit as well. 
DubaiIVCHolding, like DubaiCVC, relies on SPVs based in such jurisdictions as the Caymans. There 
has been no case of litigation although there are at least two situations where this could have 
happened. DubaiIVCHolding each time favored a more conciliatory approach: “we sit down and 
talk”. The holding company sees this as part of its Islamic spirit, though the surrounding Gulf 
relationship driven culture generally frowns upon court litigation and favors reliance on personal 





5.1. Open Coding 
In the following sections, the details which appear in the minutes of the interviews are broken 
down into concepts. Comparison throughout the analysis ensures cohesion between new 
concepts and the ones already found. 
5.1.1. Islamic vs. Conventional Perceptions 
 




 Outside Perception of Difference high/low 
 Underlying Economics different/similar 
 Internal Perception of Difference high/low 
 Perception of link to Real Assets high/low 
 Deal Initiation Difference high/low 
 Operational Difference big/small 
 
In many of our interviews, our interlocutors lamented the fact that many outsiders of the industry 
would not understand the difference between Islamic finance and conventional finance. One 
regulator expressed her frustration: “if I can’t even convince my husband [a finance professional] 
of the difference, who am I going to convince?”. Several justifications are given to explain the 
distinguishing features of Islamic finance compared to conventional finance. One is the presumed 
link of Islamic transactions to real assets, as opposed to conventional transactions which are 
perceived to be based on virtual or imaginary assets, hence somewhat fraudulent. Another 
difference stressed by insiders of the industry is how deal initiation and operational aspects are 
much more based on trust and like mindedness than in conventional finance. The underlying 
31 
 
economics of Islamic transactions are usually perceived to be very similar if not equivalent to 
conventional ones.    
5.1.2. IFI Robustness 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
IFI 
Robustness 
 Survival Rate high/low 
 Government Role high/low 
 Role of Asian Crisis high/low 
 
The Role of the Asian Crisis in the late 90s was determinant in the official promotion of Islamic 
finance in Malaysia, as the survival rate of Islamic institutions was higher than their conventional 
counterparts and contributed to the perception of robustness of the industry. Malaysia’s 
government then undertook to build Islamic financial institutions in a prudent manner by 
channeling skills from conventional finance and taking time to observe the industry’s behavior. 
5.1.3. Islamic Institutional Credibility 
 




 Checks & Balances between Government and Market Players many/few 
 Importance of Institutional Credibility high/low 
 Industry Self-Organization high/low 
 
As a faith based industry, trust in the ethical standards and religious expertise of institutions 
surrounding the Islamic finance industry is essential. As such, while Malaysia’s government leaves 
space for innovation and initiative by market players, it also acts as a certifying authority for their 
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trustworthiness, by issuing regulations, unifying sharia resolutions, or approving sharia scholars. 
The industry is also acting in this direction by creating a professional body that aims among others 
at promoting continuous education and professional certifications among its adherents. 
5.1.4. Islamic Identity 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Islamic 
Identity 
Government’s Duty to Public high/low 
Consensus Seeking high/low 
Clarity in Policy Making high/low 
Market Validation high/low 
Market willingness to Deal with Non Islamic Instruments high/low 
Role of Constituency in Policy Making high/low 
 
A pragmatic attitude among policy makers has been to promote Islamic finance as a way to fulfill 
its social duty of granting access to funds to a conservative Bumiputera constituency who would 
otherwise not deal with financial institutions without that Islamic label. Consistent with a cultural 
inclination of seeking consensus and with principles of clarity in regulations, the emphasis on the 
limited economic difference between Islamic finance and its conventional counterpart is 
considered risky and unnecessary. Success is measured by the degree by which the market 
validates these institutions. 
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5.1.5. Peer Validation 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Peer 
Validation 
 Pressure to Support high/low 
 Antagonism high/low 
 
The question was raised occasionally about critics of the Islamic financial industry’s practices in 
terms of its similarities with conventional finance. While some of those criticisms were perceived 
as valid, particularly when implying the industry should make more efforts to differentiate itself 
in terms of substance, others which may question the necessity of the industry were seen as 
destructive. As a result, it is understood that professionals working in the Islamic finance industry 
should be supportive of it. 
5.1.6. Malaysia vs. Gulf 
  
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Malaysia 
vs. Gulf 
 Idealization of Gulf Islamic Finance Framework high/low 
 Recognition of Different Classes of Shares different/similar 
 Influence of Gulf Sharia Standards high/low 
 Stringency of Standards high/low 
 
A recurring theme during our interviews was how Islamic finance would diverge between 
Malaysia and the Gulf. As the historical birthplace of Islam, some of our interlocutors idealized 
the Gulf’s Islamic financial practices as the standard that should ideally be followed. More often 
though, comparisons were made to illustrate how the less stringent sharia standards in Malaysia 
gave more flexibility in terms of financial contracting. Examples were also given on how additional 
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workarounds had to be created to satisfy Gulf sharia scholars in order to proceed with 
investments approved by Malaysian scholars. One such example concerned an investment in a 
hotel with several buildings. While approved by the Malaysian scholars, Kuwaiti scholars vetoed 
the deal due to the existence of a gender mixed swimming pool. Several attempts to reach a 
consensus by slightly modifying the project failed. The eventual solution was to finance the 
buildings which didn’t contain the contentious swimming pool at a higher proportion, and assist 
in finding a third party willing to complete the comparatively small funding necessary for the 
problematic part. 
It is noteworthy to mention that there is an active effort in Malaysia to converge its sharia 
jurisprudence with the Gulf. While this is not expected to change the substance of the industry’s 
practices, it is aimed at attracting more Middle-Eastern capital. 
5.1.7. Geographic Preference 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Geographic 
Preference 
Investee Regional Growth Strategy high/low 
Preference for Exits at Local Stock Exchange high/low 
Preference for Courts at Investee Location high/low 
Local Investment Focus high/low 
Regional or International Investment Focus high/low 
 
We asked our interviewees what their geographical preferences were. In particular, we inquired 
about their regional perspectives, their preferences in terms of stock exchange location for exits, 
courts location in case of litigation, and their area of focus for investments. We also asked them 
for each of these factors whether the choice of financial instruments and rights used in their 
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contract was affected by these preferences, and compared the answers across cases. We do find 
a relationship between geographic preference and choice of instruments and rights. However, 
this apparent relationship hides a deeper one we will discuss below: this relationship with IVC 
instruments and rights is primarily driven by the tax impact of these geographical preferences. 
5.1.8. Supply of Capital 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Supply of 
Capital 
 Competition between Islamic and Conventional Suppliers of 
Capital high/low 
 Pool of Islamic Finance Investors high/low 
 
When asked about the cost of capital in Islamic investments, and how this cost compared to 
conventional counterparts, replies on whether Islamic capital was cheaper or more expensive 
varied among our interlocutors. Two factors however stood out as the main determinants of this 
cost, suggesting it was more dependent on overall market conditions than industry specific. The 
first factor is the competition between conventional investors and Islamic investors. Because 
conventional investors have no objections in investing in Islamic instruments, demand is higher 
ceteris paribus for Islamic instruments than for conventional ones, bringing their cost down. At 
the same time, the pool size of Islamic finance investors could be much smaller, therefore inducing 
the reverse effect. 
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5.1.9. Supply of Skills 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Supply of 
Skills 
 Islamic Finance Lawyers high/low 
 Finance Professionals high/low 
 
Another market based determinant of the costs associated with Islamic finance is the supply of 
skills. Out of 13,000 lawyers in Malaysia, only a hundred are qualified to structure Islamic deals, 
for a local market size of 326 billion Malaysia Ringgit, or 107 billion US dollars. The boom in the 
sector and active governmental intervention has been on the other side facilitating the transition 
of many finance professionals from the conventional sector to the Islamic sector. 
5.1.10. Conservative Investment Style 
 




 Venture Capitalists with Banker Mentality high/low 
 Limited Partners’ Risk Aversion Relative to US high/low 
 Influence of LP’s Culture high/low 
 Risk Management Style upside/downside 
 Managerial Conservative Approach high/low 
 
A complaint found equally among both conventional and Islamic finance professionals generally, 
and venture capitalists specifically, is how conservative the investment culture is in both Kuala 
Lumpur and Dubai. While Islamic investments are often presented as more prudent, it appears 
from our interviews with conventional actors that this was more a general cultural trait than a 
specific industry characteristic. This conservatism is found at all levels of the venture capital chain, 
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including the managers themselves. LPs could weight even more on this conservative approach: 
MalaysiaBankIVCs, for example, during its investment phase has to go through the risk 
management process of its parent retail bank which concentrates exclusively on the downside. 
5.1.11. Regulator’s Objectives 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Regulator’s 
Objectives 
 Uniformity and Harmonization high/low 
 IVC Innovation high/low 
 
While the economics of the different venture capitalist, Islamic or conventional, were not 
fundamentally different, regulatory actions could lead to more distinct forms of financial 
instruments between them. As seen previously, one of the tools used by the regulator to ensure 
clarity in the Islamic financial industry is its harmonization, so nominates26 and contractual forms 
from other Islamic financial sectors show initial signs of trickling down to the IVC sector. At the 
same time, because the Malaysian government seeks to stimulate the industry’s dynamism, it 
tries not to overregulate in order to spur innovation. The MRCI instrument used by MalaysiaIIVC 
is a prime example of the effects of this policy.  
                                                          
26 Nominate, as used in El-Gamal (2006), designates the use of an Arabic name suggesting a distinct instrument for a 
common economic reality. For example, the use of murabaha implies that it refers to a distinct type of instrument from 
the classical age, whereas its actual content is usually debt. 
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5.1.12. Jurisdictional Preference 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Jurisdictional 
Preference 
 Degree of Trust in Local Law by Locals high/low 
 Degree of Trust in Local Law by Internationals high/low 
 Preference for Jurisdiction of Investee Location high/low 
 Knowledge of Local VC Regulations high/low 
 Degree of Litigation high/low 
 Caymans high/low 
 UK high/low 
 Malaysia high/low 
 Dubai Finance International Center high/low 
 
Through our cases, jurisdictional preferences are determined by several factors, including the 
knowledge of local regulations, the degree of trust in law enforcement in the jurisdictions 
considered, or convenience of location. Few Dubai based investors among those we’ve met for 
example would chose a jurisdiction other than the Caymans or the UK. We have met only one 
instance of investment whose contracts’ jurisdiction was chosen to be the Dubai Financial 
International Center. The Caymans are chosen due to their business-friendly legislation for 
financial companies. The UK is chosen by these investors because it is perceived to possess 
stronger law enforcement than any of the UAE’s, or Middle-Eastern for that matter, jurisdictions. 
This preference even applies to Dubai investors in Malaysia, probably out of familiarity. Indeed, 
Malaysian investors in contrast are perfectly comfortable with choosing Malaysia as their 
jurisdiction. Whenever we’ve met instances of other choices for Malaysian investors, it was out 
of convenience in terms of proximity to their investee company in cross border transactions. 
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Interestingly, these preferences apply to both conventional and Islamic firms. In this sense, 
jurisdictional preference is not a distinguishing feature of conventional vs. IVC. 
5.1.13. Minority Shareholders’ Protection 
 




 Level of Legal Protection high/low 
 Control Stake Sought frequent/rare 
 
Although there are few properties to this open code, it is an important element by itself as it 
usually affects how financial contracts are shaped. This issue came up in some of our interviews. 
In Dubai’s culture, where litigation is frowned upon, networks and conciliation matter a lot more 
than the regulatory protection provided to minority shareholders, which is considered weak 
anyway. In Malaysia, minority shareholders’ protection was considered weak as well. As a result, 
unless otherwise mandated by the government, as in the case of MALAYSIACVC, more 
experienced investors would pursue majority stakes when possible as one of the mitigating 
measures. We haven’t come across other strategies specific to either conventional or IVC for 
resolving this lack of protection. 
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5.1.14. Regulatory Environment 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Regulatory 
Environment 
 Influence of the Securities Commission Malaysia high/low 
 Influence of the Central Bank of Malaysia high/low 
 Influence of International Standards high/low 
 Quality high/low 
 Regulation Density on Sharia Governance high/low 
 Regulation Density for IVC high/low 
 Focus of Islamic Accounting Standards form/substance 
 Degree of Acceptance high/low 
 Specific Requirements for Sharia Jurisprudence high/low 
 Reporting Requirements many/few 
 Sharia Authority Centralization centralized/decentralized 
 
Another factor that affects how financial contracts are shaped is, of course, the regulatory 
environment. Several bodies, described in section 7.2, act as standard setters for Islamic 
jurisprudence. Some enjoy a greater degree of acceptance than others, such as the Central Bank 
and the Securities Commission in Malaysia, whereas others like the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)27, although they do enjoy a high degree of 
respect and visibility, either have little relevance to IVC or generally have limited practical follow-
                                                          
27 See section 7.2. 
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up due to lack of enforcement mechanisms. The centralization of sharia resolutions issuance as in 
the case of Malaysia also simplifies the dissemination of knowledge about Islamic finance’s rules. 
What stands out in this code though is that the regulatory focus is usually on the sharia 
governance mechanism, or that it bases accounting treatments of Islamic transactions much less 
on their economic substance than the legalistic form of the contracts and financial instruments 
used28, except where the fiscal impact would put Islamic finance at a disadvantage29. 
5.1.15. Decision Making Power 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Supervisory 
Power 
 Board of Directors strong/weak 
 Investment Committee strong/weak 
 Sharia Board strong/weak 
 Margin of Freedom for Fund Managers wide/narrow 
 
Who holds power of supervision over IVC fund managers determines what type of objective has 
priority. While we found no evidence throughout our IVC cases that sharia scholars were 
complacent in terms of sharia compliance, their interventions were limited and investment 
committees’ active involvement and supervisory power was much stronger. This necessarily tilts 
                                                          
28 See section 8.2 for a full illustration on how Islamic instruments are re-engineered to mimic conventional instruments’ 
behavior. 
29 This is the case for example for murabaha, which recreates the economics of debt through the fiction of a sale, see 
section 8.2.1. This however creates double stamp issues in many jurisdictions, which has often been eliminated by 
specific legislation stressing the economic reality of the transaction. 
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the balance in favor of the investment committees’ business objectives and creates further 
incentives for fund managers to comply with Islamic finance’s stated sharia objectives in form 
only. 
5.1.16. Industry Sophistication 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Industry 
Sophistication 
 Sophistication Relative to US high/low 
 Age of the Industry old/new 
 Years of experience of VC Professionals many/few 
 Existence of local LPs many/few 
 Number of Entrepreneurs Relative to US more/less 
 Exposure of Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists to 
Each Other  
high/low 
 Financial Knowledge of Entrepreneurs high/low 
 Fund Managers’ Exposure to Technology high/low 
 Sharia Acceptance of Intangibles high/low 
 Universe of Investment Opportunities big/small 
 Industry Maturity high/low 
 Industry Development Speed high/low 
 Cooperation between Islamic and Conventional 
Institutions 
high/low 
 Prudential Rules in Portfolio vs. Individual Assets portfolio/individual 
 
There is a learning and sophistication effect on financial contracts used in IVC. The breadth of 
instruments and rights used is clearly associated with the age and experience of both the firm and 
its managers. Younger firms and less experienced managers are less sensitized to agency issues 
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and consequently tend to face them ex post. As a result, they realize the need for more 
sophisticated instruments and rights typical of conventional venture capital ex ante and see no 
sharia objection in using them. This is the case for MalaysiaBankIVCs, the youngest firm in our 
cases. It is also the case of the relatively more experienced MalaysiaIIVC as well. DubaiIVCHolding, 
whose managers have a solid pedigree in the industry, and the older MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC 
use all the financial tools typical of any well-established firm in the US. Obstacles to learning are 
external to IVC firms. They include, in Malaysia which has a more local mandate of investment 
than Dubais’ firms, the number of entrepreneurs available and exposed to venture capital, or fund 
managers’ ability to evaluate complex projects, especially in the technology sector. Interestingly, 
these constraints are mentioned by MALAYSIACVC as well, albeit to a lesser degree. Although IVC 
in Malaysia may show a slight lag in terms of maturity compared to its conventional counterpart, 
it is catching up quickly. 
Other indicators of this sophistication come on the LP side and the prudential rules, though these 
tend to be external factors to each firm. Indeed, a greater number of LPs contribute to the 
development of a more experienced venture capital skills pool. In Malaysia, this number is 
relatively small, and interest in IVC specifically is even more limited to a number of major actors 
such as Islamic banks or public funds. In Dubai, the pool of LPs is essentially limited to wealthy 
families. Additionally, rules such as the US Prudent Investor Rule do not exist in either Malaysia 
or Dubai, thereby limiting the capital flows that could go into venture capital in general, and IVC 





Open Code Properties Dimension 
Exits 
 Preference for Acquisitions high/low 
 Preference for IPOs high/low 
 Cash Preference high/low 
 Negotiation Preference high/low 
 Ability to Influence Exit Outcome at Investment Time high/low 
 Ability to Influence Exit Outcome at Portfolio Management high/low 
 Favorable Local Stock Exchange for IPOs high/low 
 Geographical Preference for Local Stock Exchange high/low 
 Preference for Portfolio Company Location Stock Exchange high/low 
 Determined Exit Routes at Investment Time high/low 
 Regulatory IPO Simplicity high/low 
 Documented Exit Processes high/low 
 Importance of Networks high/low 
 Sharia Oversight high/low 
 Non Sharia Compliance high/low 
 Sharia Process Formalization high/low 
 
We examined how exits were planned as these may affect the way financial contracts are 
designed at inception. Of the IVC firms we have met, only MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC went 




As in conventional venture capital, the preferred exit routes are IPOs and acquisitions. Buybacks 
come as a third option. There is both a geographical and network bias in the way exits are 
foreseen. These preferences, in both our conventional and IVC cases alike, however, were not 
embodied in the contracts. In most cases they were considered too remote and unpredictable to 
be worth the attention at contract inception. 
Interestingly, sharia compliance is usually not formalized as part of the exit process, aside from 
very obvious violations30. Sharia is considered irrelevant to IPOs, considered inherently legitimate 
from an Islamic finance point of view. Whereas a sale to company that is egregiously non sharia 
compliant is unlikely, it was seen as an improbable theoretical case by most of our interlocutors.  
5.1.18. Deal Initiation 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Deal 
Initiation 
 Firm Initiative high/low 
 Entrepreneurs Initiative high/low 
 Importance of Networks in Sourcing high/low 
 Screening Sharia Criteria high/low 
 Screening Financial Parameters high/low 
 
Theoretically, this could be considered the biggest distinguishing criteria of Islamic finance from 
an economic point of view. When screening companies for investing, IVC fund managers exclude 
a small number of industries, such as the ones dealing with pork, pornography, gambling, alcohol 
                                                          
30 It would for example be unlikely that a soda company be sold to an alcoholic beverage company. 
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or arms for example. Although all exclude companies leveraged beyond a certain conventional 
debt to equity ratio, usually one third, infrastructure projects excepted, there is no such restriction 
on economically equivalent sharia compliant debt. Most IVC fund managers dismiss this 
difference as trivial however, as they see it as no different from a conventional VC fund with an 
industry focus. 
As is the case for conventional VC firms we have met, most deals are sourced through IVC firms’ 
networks by the managers’ initiative. As a result, entrepreneurs are quite indifferent generally to 
the Islamic form of the funds they receive, they tend to focus more on the economic aspects of 
their relationship. 
5.1.19. Influence of Tax 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Influence 
of Tax 
 Tax Incentives for Islamic Structures many/few 
 Tax Exemptions many/few 
 Cross-Border Transactions many/few 
 
We looked at how taxes could affect the design of Islamic financial contracts. In the cases we’ve 
been through, taxes were only relevant for cross-border transactions, where uncertainty could 
accompany the treatment of otherwise established securities as explained in the case of 
MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC. In all other cases, conventional and Islamic alike, taxes were not a 
factor as the firms were either operating in a tax friendly environment such as the Caymans or 
Dubai, or were benefiting from tax exemptions and the even playing fields created by the 
Malaysian government. Islamic debt issues for example, although structured to look like equity in 
form, are treated like conventional debt from a tax perspective in Malaysia and benefited from a 
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number of exemptions. Moreover, industries which are typical targets of venture capital funding 
such as ICT benefit from many tax exemptions. 
5.1.20. Islamic Financial Instruments 
 




 Use of Straight Equity always/often/seldom/never 
 Use of Debt always/often/seldom/never 
 Use of Personal Entrepreneur Put Option always/often/seldom/never 
 Use of Convertible Preferred always/often/seldom/never 
 Tax Incentives for Islamic Instruments always/often/seldom/never 
 Sharia Attitude towards Different Classes of 
Shares acceptance/hostility 
 Sharia Attitude towards Preferred Shares acceptance/hostility 
 Conversion Price fixed/variable 
 Tolerance to Conventional Debt acceptance/hostility 
 Tolerance to Sharia Compliant Debt acceptance/hostility 
 Complexity high/low 
 
During our interviews, we haven’t seen a conventional venture capital instrument which wasn’t 
also used in IVC, either in form or in substance. Where Islamic finance’s sharia adopts a hostile 
attitude, for example such as with debt or preferred equity, different governance mechanisms 
and contractual forms are used to reproduce the same cash flows. This ability to circumvent 
formal restrictions increases with the experience of fund managers. Conversion price when a 
convertibility option exists has to be fixed at contract inception according to Islamic finance’s 
rules, but this isn’t different from conventional practice. 
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5.1.21. Valuation Fairness 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Valuation 
Fairness 
 Relevance to Sharia high/low 
 Criteria for Fairness defined/intuitive 
 
We came across some variation within our IVC cases in terms of attitude towards how criteria 
could be judged from an Islamic perspective. While some assert “valuation has nothing to do with 
sharia”, others indicate an imperative of fairness in the process. Moreover, how fairness is defined 
depends on the interlocutor. While some posit valuation should be led by market value in order 
to be fair, others do not define it and leave it to intuition on a case by case basis. 
5.1.22. Seniority of Claims 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Seniority 
of Claims 
 Sharia Acceptance high/low 
 
In Islamic finance, sharia formally does not recognize seniority of claims in the spirit of full profit 
and loss sharing. This applies to IVC as well. However, in practice, financial rights and instruments 
which automatically affect the order of attribution of cash flow claims, such as redemption rights 
or Islamic debt for example, behave like their conventional counterparts. 
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5.1.23. Control Rights 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Control 
Rights 
 Board Seats control/minority 
 Use of Redemption Rights always/often/seldom/never 
 Use of Reservation Rights always/often/seldom/never 
 Use of Pay-to-Play Clause always/often/seldom/never 
 Use of Legal Fees and Expenses Clause always/often/seldom/never 
 Use of Special Voting Rights always/often/seldom/never 
 Influence of Negotiation Outcomes high/low 
 Influence of Risk Perception high/low 
 
Most rights typical of conventional venture capital are used without restriction in IVC when 
relevant. Exceptions are reported here. Redemption rights are not accepted by all firms, Pay-to-
Play rights are limited by the Islamic finance prohibition on preferred equity. Special voting rights, 
that is shares with a greater voting weight, are considered illegitimate, and breakup clauses 
imposing the reimbursement of charges incurred are subject to varying limitations. As with Islamic 
securities though, it is possible to circumvent most of those restrictions in substance. Redemption 
rights, where forbidden by the sharia board can be synthesized from convertible Islamic debt and 
options. Pay-to-play rights can be obtained by structuring the underlying preferred shares as 
dividend yielding Islamic debt as well. Special voting rights can either be obtained through 
changing the numerical ratios of shares where possible, or mitigated through reservation rights, 
which are perfectly accepted. No workaround is sought for the fact that legal fees and expenses 
are partially born by the Islamic venture capitalists in case of breakup during negotiation. There 
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is insufficient data to evaluate whether the difference between the conventional practice of a flat 
fee and the IVC practice of third party cost or half of it, born by the entrepreneurs is material. 
As in conventional venture capital, which clause appears and which doesn’t in each term sheet 
and contract is a matter of negotiation and risk perception in Islamic finance. 
5.1.24. Alternative Use of Rights 
 




 Implicit Obligations many/few 
 Use of Staging to Enforce Obligations always/often/seldom/never 




Where Islamic finance renders formally illicit certain instruments such as fixed income securities 
or preferred equity, some workarounds exist. Reuse of typical but licit governance mechanisms 
such as staged financing are used to obtain informally what would otherwise be a formal 
requirement. This is especially true for cash flow claims, where gifts can replace required dividend 
distributions for example. Likewise, continuous sharia compliance over initial industry restrictions 
or conventional leverage ratios does not require specific clauses. Typical conventional rights such 
as reserve matters, giving the fund managers veto rights on material changes of business plan are 
understood to include sharia matters. 
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5.1.25. Term Sheets 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Term 
Sheets 
 Standardization high/low 
 Complexity high/low 
 Use always/often/seldom/never 
 
We found some variation in term sheets across our cases. Conventional firms used them 
systematically, starting from an internal standard template and customizing them for each deal. 
These templates contain all typical tools of a venture capitalist, and in the case of DubaiCVC, which 
does cross-border deals, is the same for Europe as well as emerging markets. IVC firms’ use of 
term sheets is more dependent on experience. Whereas MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC and 
DubaiIVCHolding proceed in the same way as conventional firms, MalaysiaIIVC’ term sheets are 
simpler, although growing in complexity with time, and MalaysiaBankIVCs has yet to use them. 
Revealing of IVC’s similarities with conventional venture capital, the term sheet templates for 
many IVC deals are the same as the ones written for conventional deals.  
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5.1.26. Firm Characteristics 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Firm 
Characteristics 
 Type of VC firm government/bank/independent 
 Industry focus diversified/tech 
 Competitive Positioning leader/small player 
 Regulatory Tax Advantages high/low 
 Age old/new 
 Legal Structure corporation/LP 
 
We have inquired about firm characteristics to understand how this could affect the design of 
financial contracts. First, we found that differences in economics between our conventional 
venture capital cases and our IVC firms were related to experience, as denoted by the age of the 
firm. Other properties above didn’t affect IVC contracts in a way that was specifically Islamic. 
5.1.27. Fund Manager Characteristics 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Fund Manager 
Characteristics 
 Years of Experience in VC senior/intermediate/junior 
 Commitment to Business Objectives high/low 
 Commitment to Sharia Objectives high/low 
 Spiritual Sharia Compliance Level idealistic/pragmatic 
 Spiritual Ease with Choosing Reference Sharia 
Framework comfortable/uneasy 
 
We looked at fund managers’ characteristics and how they could affect Islamic financial contracts. 
We found that more experienced managers, while still as committed in spirit to the ideals of 
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fairness and brotherly partnerships with their investees, were more focused on the economics of 
their deals than junior managers. In this sense, experienced IVC fund managers are no different 
from their conventional counterparts when it comes to attention to the bottom line and managing 
agency issues. Among the instruments at their disposal to circumvent sharia restrictions that may 
be incompatible with their business mandate is the choice of level of compliance. For example, 
while Islamic finance ideals discourage the use of debt, managers could choose to use an 
economically equivalent sharia compliant debt to achieve their business objectives although some 
may feel spiritually more comfortable using equity. This spiritual constraint is also influenced by 
the multiplicity of sharia frameworks, for example some frameworks recognize multiple classes 
of shares while others do not. 
5.1.28. Limited Partners Characteristics 
 




 Type private/public/bank 
 Nationality Gulf/Malaysia/International 
 Multiplicity high/low 
 Outsiders many/few 
 
During our interviews, we examined several characteristics which may affect the way an IVC firm 
designs its financial contracts. While the type of limited partners on board doesn’t have a direct 
impact on Islamic issues, their nationality had an important effect. Nationality of the LPs may 
indeed affect the stringency of the sharia standards to be applied, such as with the more 
conservative Gulf, thereby increasing the distance between the formal abidance by sharia 
principles in IVC contracts and the economic reality of the corresponding deals. When, in addition 
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to the founders of the IVC firm, multiple LPs and other outsiders invest, a tighter focus on the 
bottom line occurs, potentially further increasing the gap between contract form and economic 
reality.  
5.1.29. Social Mandate 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Social 
Mandate 
 Training of Future VCs high/low 
 Mobilize Private Investors high/low 
 Muslim Assistance Agenda high/low 
 Entrepreneurial Development high/low 
 
As sharia ideals often express a social role, we have looked at whether the firms we’ve met had 
social specificities. Only two firms had an explicit social mandate, one conventional, the other 
Islamic. Out of the four properties, described above, indicating each of the social mandates we 
observed, three were part of MalaysiaCVC’s mandate, the conventional government backed firm. 
The fourth one is a duty the independent IVC assigned itself and is slightly more general than 
many similar Bumiputera policies: “do something for the Umma [i.e. the global Muslim 
community] by favoring Muslim employment”. This impacts the size of their universe of potential 
investments as they will only invest in companies that have at least 50% Muslim employment. 
This only affects the IVC lifecycle at the screening stage though, so contracts and management 
style are otherwise unrelated to the firm’s social mandate. 
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5.1.30. Entrepreneurial Attitude 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Entrepreneurial 
Attitude 
 Commitment to IVC high/low 
 Deal Shopping high/low 
 Indifference to Sharia high/low 
 
As all deals we’ve seen in IVC were sourced by the venture capitalists rather the entrepreneurs, 
there was no specific personal commitment from the latter on sharia matters. Those 
entrepreneurs who approach IVC firms generally have strong financials and are shopping for 
deals. This makes them less interesting to the IVC managers we’ve met who have a preference for 
exclusive deals, as they, otherwise, have little protection against costs of non-closed deals. This 
lack of commitment to Islamic financial ideals creates a type of agency issue, though non 
pecuniary, as entrepreneurs may decide to deviate from sharia restrictions. 
Moreover, where IVC managers actually believed in a selfless partnership between themselves 
and their entrepreneurs, investments nearly resulted in compete losses. Indeed, in these cases 
entrepreneurs chose to disregard many of the obligations deliberately left out of contracts due to 
an overly idealistic interpretation of sharia. 
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5.1.31. VC-Entrepreneur Relationship 
 




 Trust high/low 
 Value Adding Portfolio Management high/low 
 Consensual Management high/low 
 Decision Freedom Granted to Investee high/low 
 Time to Build Relationship high/low 
 Manners and Like-Mindedness high/low 
 Comradeship high/low 
 Risk Perception high/low 
 
IVC and conventional venture capital firms differ when it comes to relationships with their 
investees primarily in the emphasis on trust, like-mindedness and comradeship apparent in the 
interviews. In practice however, both conventional and Islamic firms take time to build 
relationships with their potential investees. Conventional firms say this is a risk mitigating tool. 
Other claims of benefits brought to investees, such as value adding portfolio management, and 
the amount of autonomy given to entrepreneurial decision-making are part of each firm’s 
investment style and not exclusive to either conventional or Islamic firms. 
5.1.32. Investee Monitoring 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Investee 
Monitoring 
 Amount high/low 




How monitoring is done is at least partially reflected in the covenants accompanying issued 
securities and in the rights specified in the financial contracts. The amount of monitoring by IVC 
firms is a matter of investment style. Across our cases, we have seen variation. This variation is 
not specific to Islamic firms however. Although the Islamic finance ideal is that true partnership 
amounts to fewer agency issues, and therefore requires less monitoring, ceteris paribus, in IVC 
firms like in conventional firms we’ve met, less monitoring means shifting investment style to 
later stage targets where institutionalization plays a role in mitigating agency issues. 
5.1.33. Sharia Macro-Parameters 
 




 Margin of Interpretation around Compliance Criteria wide/narrow 
 
Sharia Macro-Parameters are the first criteria used to select a potential target company.  They 
can be summarized as an examination of the industry of the target company. It is based on the 
exclusion of some industries, such as those dealing in pork, gambling, pornography, or arms, with 
some variations across firms. This is one of the main distinguishing features of the investment 
mandate of IVC compared to the broader venture capital sector. 
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5.1.34. Sharia Micro-Parameters 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Sharia Micro-
Parameters 
Margin of Interpretation around Compliance Criteria wide/narrow 
Importance of Financial Instruments in Compliance high/low 
Undesirability of Leverage high/low 
 
Sharia Micro-Parameters are the financial criteria used to filter eligible companies. All IFIs use 
conventional leverage as the main filtering criteria. This is another one of the principal 
distinguishing features of the investment mandate of IVC compared to the broader VC sector. 
However, there is some leeway as to how those leverage ratios are interpreted. First, although 
Islamic and conventional debt are economically equivalent and people attracted to Islamic finance 
ideals aspire to have no debt, Islamic debt is not included in leverage calculations. Second, the 
degree of leverage of target companies tolerated varies across IVC firms and target industries. For 
instance, while it is accepted that infrastructure projects are not restricted in terms of 
conventional debt, when and for how long varies. Some sharia scholars will demand that the 
conventional debt of infrastructure companies which they tolerate at investment time be 
converted to Islamic debt within a horizon of three years. For other industries, the most widely 
accepted leverage ratio is one third. Depending on firms or their sharia scholars however, the 
tolerance level may go down to 5% or even zero in the case of some Gulf scholars. 
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5.1.35. Islamic Contract Cost 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Islamic 
Contract Cost 
Sharia Advisory Fees high/low 
Sharia Cost for Each Securities Issue high/low 
Standardization of IVC Contracts high/low 
Customization of Transactions high/low 
 
The design of an Islamic contract incurs various additional costs compared to conventional 
equivalents. These costs include sharia advisory fees, the cost of each security issue in a sharia 
compliant manner, and the Islamic customization of each transaction for a sector that does not 
have standardized instruments yet. However, while these costs can be high in absolute terms in 
certain segments of Gulf Islamic finance, such as sukuk issues, we found no evidence that these 
sharia costs were material compared to overall transaction costs in IVC. 
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5.1.36. Sharia Operations 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Sharia 
Operations 
 Formally Defined Internal Processes high/low 
 Internal Process Efficiency high/low 
 Existence of Sharia Committee yes/no 
 Intermediate Unit of Sharia yes/no 
 Guidelines for Sharia Governance high/low 
 Formal Compliance Checks at Screening Stage yes/no 
 Formal Compliance Checks at Due Diligence Stage yes/no 
 Formal Compliance Checks at Screening Stage yes/no 
 Formal Compliance Checks at Management Stage yes/no 
 Formal Compliance Checks at Exit Stage yes/no 
 Sharing Sharia Functions Across Units yes/no 
 
Because Islamic financial institutions are distinct in the way they operate in terms of integration 
of sharia components in their structure and processes, we discussed how IVC firms were 
structured and how this could be linked to financial contracts and influence potential agency 
issues. It emerged that IVC firms’ operations differ little from their conventional counterparts’. 
Most do not have a sharia unit per se, interventions from sharia scholars are sporadic, often at 
the screening stage of the investment lifecycle, with few, if any, formal checks afterwards. 
Judgment on sharia compliance is mostly left to the discretion of IVC fund managers who follow 
guidelines, if any exist in the firm. Where IVC firms are offshoots of banks, they don’t even have 
internal sharia units, they share the units of their parent banks. 
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5.1.37. Sharia Compliance 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Sharia 
Compliance 
 Aspiration to Comply with Regulation high/low 
 Firm Reputation Risk high/low 
 Degree of Formalization of Compliance Criteria high/low 
 Stringency of Sharia Requirements high/low 
 External Enforcement of Sharia Compliance high/low 
 Margin of Freedom in Sharia Compliance high/low 
 Use of Benchmarks high/low 
 Duration to Compliance long/short 
 
There are several interpretations of what sharia is. Within each of these interpretations, the 
degree of sharia compliance depends on a number of parameters. Of these, there is the degree 
to which the various actors within the IVC firm itself actually aspire to sharia ideals. Although the 
degree of public scrutiny of IVC firms is much lower than that of retail IFIs, the reputational risk 
from doubtful compliance is real. The unclear definition of compliance leads to dramatically 
different requirements established in different IVC firms, for example, such as the different ratios 
of conventional leverage noted earlier in the thesis. 
Interestingly, there is an aspect of pragmatism to the restrictions imposed, as confirmed by 
several of our interviewees, across the Islamic finance industry. As mentioned previously, 
infrastructure projects, which would normally be leveraged beyond the usual Islamic finance 
standards, benefit from a greater debt to equity ratio tolerance from sharia scholars than do other 
industries. Due to the nature of the projects financed in the regions where Islamic finance is most 
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active, infrastructure and real estate, requiring the standard, conservative, debt-to-equity ratios 
for these types of projects would reduce the universe of opportunity to the point of irrelevance. 
Little oversight is carried out on exits as they are assumed to be sharia compliant, although 
theoretical cases of violations are possible, such as exits through share swaps with non-compliant 
companies. Sharia scholars sometimes show flexibility by granting time to reach what they deem 
to be full compliance. 
5.1.38. Sharia Variations 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Sharia 
Variations 
 Differences among Different Schools of Jurisprudence high/low 
 Relative Stringency of Gulf vs. Malaysia Requirements high/low 
 Applicability of External Sharia Frameworks high/low 
 Influence of International Sharia Frameworks high/low 
 Interactions with Academia high/low 
 Consensual Decision Making Among Scholars high/low 
 
In addition to the possible levels of compliance within one understanding of sharia, there are 
varying definitions of what sharia itself is. In other words, Islamic financial jurisprudence is not 
uniform. Some factors act as a converging force between these interpretations, while others do 
the opposite. First, several major schools of classical jurisprudence exist, four of them Sunni. In 
the Gulf, the dominant school is Hanbali while the Shafii School is dominant in Malaysia. Within 
each of these schools, individual scholars interpret according to their own worldview of what 
Islamic principles uphold. There are disagreements on how much each school can practically 
borrow from the other, some scholars claiming, for example, that different social contexts such 
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as Malaysian multiculturalism makes it impossible to borrow the most stringent features of Gulf 
interpretations, whereas other scholars reject anything short of international consensus. Sharia 
resolutions being adopted by way of voting are another source of variation, as minority scholars 
can influence other institutions they work with. Academia, on the other hand, acts as a 
homogenizing factor as scholars exchange opinions and train future professionals. 
These variations in sharia interpretations are a source of opportunity for IVC managers as they 
can choose the sharia compliant contractual forms with the least constraints thereby reducing 
the necessity to compromise on the substance of their dealings. 
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5.1.39. Sharia Staff 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Sharia Staff 
 Conflict of Interest high/low 
 Reputation Risk high/low 
 Experience high/low 
 Relevant Academic Background high/low 
 Reports to BOD high/low 
 Business Awareness high/low 
 Compensation Level high/low 
 Density of Presence Across Different Sharia Boards high/low 
 Time Dedication high/low 
 Existence of Professional Bodies high/low 
 Sophistication of the Recruitment Process high/low 
 Importance of Networks high/low 
 Pragmatic Considerations high/low 
 Level of Screening at Licensing and Recruitment high/low 
 Gap Between Aspirations and Reality high/low 
 Level of Compromise high/low 
 Conditions and Corrective Measures on Compromise high/low 
 Exposure to Intangible Assets high/low 
 Power on Business Decisions high/low 




The Sharia staff is a fundamental element in how contractual sharia compliance is shaped in IVC. 
Their attitude towards different details of Islamic finance contracts is determined by many 
properties, including their experience, their academic background, and their exposure and 
understanding of finance among others. IVC managers told us during interviews that, for example, 
sharia staff with more finance background, acquired through either education or professional 
exposure, was more lenient in terms of accepting conventional financial instruments as 
legitimate. One of the consistent prohibitions we’ve encountered, on which “scholars need to be 
educated” according to one of the IVC managers we’ve met, is their acceptance of financing 
intangible assets. 
We found no evidence that business incentives or hierarchical structure were driving sharia staff 
to willfully disregard the economic reality of the transactions they were approving. In Malaysia, 
the compensation levels we observed were fixed and within white-collar ranges31. There is no 
dismissal mechanism but the sharia staff was pressured to dedicate the necessary time to their 
sharia compliance work and to educating themselves to be able to renew the licenses that the 
Securities Commission or the Central Bank of Malaysia granted them32. In the Gulf, on the other 
                                                          
31 In our interviews in Malaysia, total compensation packages we observed amounted to anywhere between 20 to 50 
thousand Malaysian Ringgit annually.  In comparison, a software engineer in Kuala Lumpur makes an average of 47,568 
Malaysian Ringgit annually (source: http://www.payscale.com/research/MY/Location=Kuala-Lumpur/Salary, retrieved 
Jan. 2, 2013). 
32 In Malaysia, sharia scholars sitting on sharia boards have to be approved and licensed by the Central Bank of Malaysia, 
or, in the case of Islamic Venture Capital funds, by the Securities Commission of Malaysia. This licensing requirement 
does not apply to employed sharia staff. 
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hand, we have heard rumors that many of the high profile scholars sitting on sharia boards were 
receiving stellar compensations in exchange for approving otherwise illegitimate products33. This 
was not the case for the staff working in any the IVC firms we met in the Gulf. 
In the IVC firms covered by this study, sharia staff has the power to force an exit or veto a deal if 
they deem it non-compliant. There is a theoretical possibility that uncompromising scholars would 
not be hired again. Our interlocutors indicate this is unheard of though. The reputational 
foundation on which the Islamic finance business model is based largely precludes that possibility 
in practice. In fact, Sharia staff recruitment is largely based on networks which certify their 
reputation of integrity. Another side-effect of this reputational element is that it creates a 
professional risk for sharia staff resulting in a structural incentive to be more conservative against 
conventional tools. 
5.1.40. Sharia Monitoring 
 
                                                          
33 Comments from interviewees working in Gulf IFIs, sometimes virulently sarcastic, were in line with the Ünal (2011) 
study. For the approval of a sukuk issue for example, high profile scholars could receive a fee of several hundred 
thousands of dollars (Ünal, 2011). According to our interviewees, some of the approved products were later recalled 
for lack of sharia compliance. 
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Open Code Properties Dimension 
Sharia 
Monitoring 
 Intuitive Process high/low 
 Frequency high/low 
 Influence of the Accounting and Auditing 
Processes 
high/low 
 Use of an Audit Plan always/often/seldom/never 
 Use of Validity Criteria always/often/seldom/never 
 
Sharia monitoring is explored to find out the impact of this additional governance mechanism in 
comparison with conventional venture capital. During our interviews, we found that sharia 
monitoring is an intuitive process for less experienced and independent firms. Fund managers 
carry out the monitoring on an ad-hoc basis. More mature and bank backed firms have more 
established processes as their sharia boards are involved at defined decision. Guidelines do define 
rules for periodic sharia audits in the more experienced firms. Sharia monitoring basically ensures 
the sharia macro and micro parameters are still within valid range. There is very little intrusion, if 
any, in what is operationally equivalent to conventional venture capital processes. 
5.1.41. Multiculturalism 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Multiculturalism 
 Non-Muslim Participation high/low 
 Chinese Participation high/low 






Ethnicity plays in important role in this distinction between Islamic finance and conventional 
finance. In a multicultural environment where many of the IVC industry participants are non-
Muslim, or Chinese as is often the case in Malaysia, sharia rules tend to be relaxed. This translates 
into financial contracts that more readily use conventional denominations for their financial 
instruments. As one fund manager put it: “I don’t use sexy names if I don’t need to”. 
5.1.42. Islamic Windows 
 
Open Code Properties Dimension 
Islamic 
Windows 
Workaround Sharia Restrictions more/fewer 
 
There have been frequent claims that the Islamic windows of conventional banks were more lax 
in their sharia compliance, being driven by market demand rather than belief in Islamic ideals. We 
have seen no evidence that. Of the four IVC firms we have met, only MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC 
is the offshoot of a non-Islamic bank. We found that MalaysiaIslamicWindowVC bases the design 
of its contract on the same set of rules issued by local and international bodies as the others. The 
discrepancy between formal compliance with Islamic finance’s jurisprudence and the economic 
reality of the financial rights and instruments used in their transactions is general to all IFIs we 
came across, IVC firms included.  
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5.1.43. IVC Innovation 
 






IVC innovation is spurred by the need to circumvent Islamic finance’s restrictions and to respond 
to the economic needs of conventional venture capital as it serves the same function.  
5.2. Axial Coding 
Axial Coding is the stage where previous concepts are further abstracted along the Grounded 
Theory paradigm in order to establish links between them. They will serve to undertake selective 
coding, ordering the set of concepts found throughout these interviews into a theory of financial 
contracting in IVC. 
5.2.1. Muslim Socio-Economic Empowerment 
 








The perception that the Islamic identity is associated with superior moral values which practically 
translate into superior products and services is at the core of the existence of Islamic finance in 
general. Islamic finance, and Islamic venture capital in particular, is not meant to stand on its own, 
it is to be constantly compared with conventional finance to prove its advantage. 
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The notion of an Islamic identity plays an even stronger role in a situation like Malaysia where 
latent ethnic tensions between the Muslim Malays and the Chinese minority are high, and have 
strong undertones of competition over the country’s resources. As a result, many Muslim Malays 
clearly favor dealing with institutions which they perceive as belonging to their community. It also 
translates into explicit mandates aimed at redistributing wealth in favor of Muslims. 
5.2.2. Industry Credibility 
 




Islamic Institutional Credibility 
Peer Validation 
 
Because much of the Islamic finance industry viability rests on its image of higher integrity and 
robustness, it is important that this reputation is maintained. Perception of a higher survival rates 
combined with active government and industry intervention contribute to perpetuate it. Peer 
pressure diminishes the risk of detractors staining that reputation. 
Although public exposure of IVC is lower than for the rest of the Islamic finance industry, the 
reputational risks associated with it could extend beyond its limits. As a result, Malaysia’s 






Axial Code Open Codes 
Conservatism Conservative Investment Style 
 
The “Conservative Investment Style” stands on its own as a description of how conservative the 
general investment culture is in both Kuala Lumpur and Dubai. With a “banker mentality” as one 
of our interlocutors put it among Malaysian venture capitalists, and with LPs in Dubai who 
culturally still feel more comfortable with tangible yielding assets, conservatism is not an exclusive 
trait of IVC. 
5.2.4. Market Conditions and Sharia Cost 
 
Axial Code Open Codes 
Market Conditions 
and Sharia Cost 
Supply of Capital 
Supply of Skills 
Islamic Finance Innovation 
Islamic Contract Cost 
 
The concept represented by this axial code is the relationship between market conditions and 
sharia costs. It sums up the set of concepts we observed during our interviews which were found 
to be determinants of the cost of sharia compliance. While we did find evidence that there are 
transaction costs associated with sharia compliance, who bears them is dependent on those 
market conditions. In some cases it could be the venture capitalist or the entrepreneur, in other 
cases it could be the investor if the demand for Islamic investments involves a high number of 
conventional investors comparatively to the number of Islamic investors. The amounts involved 
72 
 
depend on the relative supply of skills in the different specialties involved in enforcing the sharia 
framework. 
Islamic finance innovation is also related to market conditions. Whether initiated by imitation of 
conventional instruments or by an individual need whose solution already exists in the 
conventional sector, the created instruments or the cost of managing the investment have to be 
competitive with the conventional sector. This in turn creates a downward pressure on sharia 
costs. 
These variations notwithstanding, we found no clear indication of how material this cost of sharia 
compliance was overall. 
5.2.5. Emerging Markets Legal Conditions 
 




Minority Shareholders’ Protection 
Regulatory Environment 
 
Three of the open codes explain some of the characteristics we observed in the financial 
contracting preferences of our interlocutors. There are clear characteristics of weak law 
enforcement typical of emerging markets with some of the usual associated behaviors: choice of 
outside jurisdictions, or trying to acquire majority stakes from entrepreneurs. Whereas some of 
the behavioral patterns we observe in Islamic venture capital might be thought of as specifically 
Islamic if compared with conventional US counterparts, we do in fact find them to be comparable 
to their conventional counterparts within the same legal environments. 
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5.2.6. Conventional Investment Lifecycle 
 







When discussing the different phases of the investment lifecycle in IVC, the differences with the 
investment lifecycle of conventional venture capital are barely noticeable. Sharia compliance is 
rarely, if at all, considered at exit, rather, it is used as a screening parameter based on the 
conventional debt ratios as well as the choice of the industry at deal initiation, and in some cases 
enforced through light periodic audits at the portfolio management stage. Where these audits 
happen, they examine the main debt financial ratios and rely on declarations from the investee 
company’s management. Consequently, the practical differences between conventional and 
Islamic venture capital, once the investment has been made, appear to be trivial.   
5.2.7. Similar Financial Contracts 
 
Axial Code Open Codes 
Similar Financial 
Contracts 
Islamic Financial Instruments 
Valuation Fairness 
Seniority of Claims 
Control Rights 





This is where the gap between contractual form and economic substance may be widest in IVC, 
although it is not as striking as in other sectors of Islamic finance such as banking. Indeed, because 
the need to emphasize the Islamic characters of financial dealings is less acute in IVC due to lower 
public scrutiny, the need to depart in form from conventional contractual forms is also lower.  As 
mentioned previously and as we will demonstrate in Appendix 8.2, where they differ, Islamic 
financial instruments closely approximate the economic payouts of conventional financial 
instruments. Conventional control rights are further used to control the behavior of issued 
instruments where Islamic finance introduces minor inefficiencies, such as receiving dividends on 
preferred equity where formal contracts do not obligate the investee to distribute them. The rest, 
from the pecking order of cash claims to term sheets and valuation, are essentially the same. 
5.2.8. Conventional Factors and IVC Contractual Design 
 
Axial Code Open Codes 
Conventional 
Factors and IVC 
Contractual Design 
Geographic Preference 
Influence of Tax 
 
As with conventional financial contracts, Islamic securities are chosen according to their economic 
efficiency relative to tax regulations. In addition to this concern, the legal uncertainty specific to 
Islamic finance has to be taken into account: many countries still lack the regulation and 
jurisprudence that provide the contract designers with the assurance that their instruments and 
rights will be interpreted the way they were intended. As a result, IVC contract design tries to stay 
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as conventional as possible, or at least, choose among the few Islamic securities which have been 
well tested in related courts. 
5.2.9. Maturity 
 




Fund Manager Characteristics 
Limited Partners Characteristics 
 
Less mature IVC firms, LPs and fund managers try to conform to the ideals of Islamic finance in 
substance. However fewer control rights, minority stakes in environments of weak legal 
protection for minority shareholders, straight equity securities with little disciplining effects lead 
to magnified agency issues. Islamic venture capitalists are left at the mercy of entrepreneur hold-
ups, trilateral bargaining and moral hazard issues. As a result, as Islamic venture capitalists acquire 
experience, they naturally respond to these agency issues by using economically similar answers 
to those used in conventional finance, although they maintain, in discourse, their commitment to 
Islamic finance’s ideals. 
5.2.10. Agency 
 








In the discourse of Islamic venture capitalists, trust and like-mindedness are an important aspect 
of their relationship with the entrepreneurs. These play two roles: first, they give Islamic venture 
capitalists a non-pecuniary benefit of moral and spiritual comfort. Second, as in conventional 
venture capital, keeping a close relationship is part of a venture capitalist’s role of reducing 
information asymmetries while monitoring their investments and actively managing them to add 
value.  
5.2.11. Investment Policy 
 





These are the main criteria of filtering out target companies. Given that Islamic debt is acceptable 
and there are routes to “Islamicizing” debt, the practical result of this policy would be to reduce 
the universe of potential investments by excluding some industries. Effectively, with an industry 
focus such as Information and Communication Technologies for the majority of the cases we 





Axial Code Open Codes 
Flexibility 






Among the tools the IVC industry possesses to pragmatically circumvent the restrictions imposed 
by Islamic finance is the variety of interpretations of its rules, both among scholars and across 
borders. While the phenomenon of flexibly picking and choosing the most favorable religious 
opinions is limited, to a certain extent, at the individual level by the reputational risk and the 
actual power of the sharia scholars, it is apparent at the institutional level where business 
objectives dominate.   
5.2.13. Non-Intrusiveness 
 
Axial Code Open Codes 
Non-Intrusiveness 
Sharia Staff 




More apparent in other sectors of the Islamic finance industry, the sharia compliance process is 
operationally relatively unobtrusive in IVC. Aside from guidelines concerning maintaining 
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conventional debt ratios and industry commitment, or rudimentary regular audits conducted by 
some IVC firms, the actual sharia related activities in an IVC firm are virtually non-existent. 
Therefore, operationally, an IVC firm is barely distinguishable from a conventional firm. 
5.3. Selective Coding 









 Similar Financial Contracts







5.3.1. The Core Phenomenon 
The core phenomenon which appears across all the codes and topics we have seen is the constant 
dichotomy between the form of Islamic contracts and their substance. Islamic instruments are 
engineered to mimic as closely as possible the behavior of conventional instruments, and control 
rights are largely unchanged. Names however may change, sometimes to reflect a more Islamic 
identity, and the management of some rights is shifted outside the contractual realm. 
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5.3.2. Causal Conditions 
 
Axial Codes 
Muslim Socio-Economic Empowerment 
Agency 
 
Two diverging forces constitute the causal conditions leading to the constant dichotomy between 
form and substance in Islamic venture capital. 
On the one hand, sociological factors create a market demand for a distinctly Islamic finance 
sector. Most actors on the demand side are not sophisticated investors and, consequently, do not 
fully evaluate the underlying economics of the financial contracts. The demand, however, rests 
on a perception of both moral and economic superiority of transactions with an Islamic label over 
conventional ones. Perceived advantages include fairness in dealings and reduced systematic risk. 
Additional perceived advantages are the group solidarity mechanisms they provide by trading 
mostly with Muslims, or to the benefit of Muslims. IVC is a necessary component of Islamic 
finance, as it fills the role conventional venture capital plays in conventional finance. For Islamic 
institutional investors, it constitutes the channel through which a portion of their investments is 
allocated to the risk/return profile of conventional venture capital, while remaining compliant 
with the Islamic financial rules as their market requires. 
On the other hand, prescriptions in Islamic financial theory effectively increase agency issues. The 
problem is aggravated in IVC as private entrepreneurial investments are characterized by more 
pronounced agency issues than other investments. For example, the disciplining effects of debt 
on entrepreneurs and management would be excluded due to Islamic finance restrictions. More 
generally, all kinds of moral hazards are increased if pure straight equity is exclusively used as is 
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usually recommended in Islamic finance ideals of profit and loss sharing. Likewise, in the regions 
where Islamic finance is in demand, infrastructure projects, for example, are in high demand, 
more so than technological projects. Being highly leveraged in nature, restrictions on debt, for 
example, if actually implemented in substance would practically rule out investments in this 
industry, consequently reducing the relevance of IVC. 





Conventional Factors and IVC Contractual Design 
 
Several factors constrain or facilitate the response of Islamic venture capitalists to the diverging 
forces of the demand for a distinctly Islamic venture capital and the need to efficiently manage 
agency issues. 
The first one is the drive to maintain the credibility of the Islamic financial sector in general, and 
IVC in particular. This compels financial regulators to impose frameworks aiming at more stability, 
and at an increased convergence of interpretations of Islamic financial rules. These rules, of 
course, have a binding effect on, or at least influence, IVC contracting. Peer pressure also helps in 
protecting actual economic practice against criticism for its deviation from its stated discourse. 




The second factor is the maturity of all actors involved. Countries with a more mature Islamic 
finance industry offer more resources to circumvent Islamic financial restrictions in practice and 
less legal uncertainty around the more complex instruments Islamic venture capitalists use. 
Likewise, more experienced Islamic venture capitalists have a higher awareness about the 
different types of agency issues they are likely to face. At the same time, they are better 
acquainted with the different contracting rights and instruments they can use while satisfying the 
sharia compliance test. 
Finally, Islamic venture capitalists, like their conventional counterparts, are influenced by the legal 
and fiscal environment in which they operate. For example, the different fiscal treatments of the 




Emerging Markets Legal Conditions 
Conservatism 
Market Conditions and Sharia Cost 
 
Two broad factors were found to define the general context in which IVC operates. These factors 
are not directly linked to the form-substance dichotomy in IVC, but influence all the characteristics 
of IVC. Phenomena which could be wrongly interpreted as IVC specific first should be examined 
comparatively under these filters in order to be correctly understood. First, both Malaysia and the 
UAE exhibit emerging markets characteristics when it comes to their legal environment, though 
at varying degrees. An environment that provides better minority shareholder protection, for 
example, could reduce the gap between form and substance as pure equity would involve fewer 
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agency issues. Second, venture capital in both Malaysia and the UAE are structurally conservative, 
often compared to banking by our interlocutors. As an illustration, a shift in risk appetite may put 
more tension on the form-substance dichotomy as the IVC universe of investments includes more 
intangible assets. 
The third factor, the impact of market conditions on sharia costs, is more difficult to categorize as 
a purely contextual factor. Indeed, the number and sophistication of IVC skills available on the 
market or the ability of Islamic financial engineers to provide more resources to Islamic venture 
capitalists may be expected to impact their interactional strategies. However, we have found no 
such link during our interviews. In fact, this factor appears to be more of an environmental factor 
reflected indirectly in financial contracts. 






The interactional strategy used to face the causal conditions that lead to the form-substance 
dichotomy is dual. First, the distinctive Islamic character of IVC is mostly obtained through a loose 
investment policy defined by few relevant restrictions on certain industries. Second, where 
Islamic financial restrictions have a more material impact on their management of agency issues, 
Islamic venture capitalists respond by taking advantage of the flexibility that different 
interpretations of Islamic finance jurisprudence offer. They pragmatically choose the ones that 







Similar Financial Contracts 
Conventional Investment Lifecycle 
 
As a consequence of the interactional strategies adopted, the operational process of an IVC firm 
is very similar to a conventional one and sharia compliance processes are minimal, often reduced 
to mere guidelines freely implemented by the fund managers. Contracts are economically the 
same, although they may differ somewhat in form, with some minor inefficiencies and costs 
introduced if necessary to maintain that form. 
5.4. The Theory 
We represent our paradigm diagram in a more detailed conceptual diagram on page 86. Following 
our qualitative analysis, this helps us finally state the new theory: 
The form-substance dichotomy is a central characteristic of IVC. Market demand for an 
Islamic brand of venture capital based on ideals of fairness and solidarity clashes with the 
reality of an array of agency issues and claims venture capitalists need to address. The 
capacity of Islamic venture capitalists to address these conflicting forces increases with 
their experience. Their ability is, however, constrained by their fiscal and legal 
environments. Commitment to Islamic ideals is therefore signaled through an investment 
policy excluding a small number of industries and through the use of Islamic financial 
instruments. The latter are different in name but have little economic difference, if any, 
with their conventional counterparts. Minor economic inefficiencies can result, but they 
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are insignificant overall. IVC is thus operationally and economically equivalent to 
conventional venture capital. 
We can further detail and break down this theory in a set of assertions which could later be tested 
through follow up quantitative studies:  
1. Ceteri paribus, investments in IVC and investments in conventional VC do not differ 
significantly in terms of their economic payouts. 
2. Junior IVC players will incur significantly higher agency costs than senior IVC players. More 
experienced Islamic venture capitalists use a wider array of financial instruments and 
rights. 
3. Malaysian contracts will display greater variety and more sophistication in their Islamic 
instruments than contracts from other areas. 
4. Experienced Islamic venture capitalists use conventional rights to enforce implicit 
obligations which reproduce conventional venture capital payouts. In some states of the 
world however, these rights may be insufficient, leading at least theoretically to economic 
inefficiencies for the Islamic venture capitalist. 
5. There are additional transaction costs associated with Islamic venture capital. However, 
they are not significant economically relative to overall IVC transaction costs. 
6. Overall transaction costs do not differ significantly between IVC and conventional VC. 
7. A larger pool of Islamic financial skills in the market drives specific IVC transaction costs 
down. 
8. A larger pool of conventional investors relative to Islamic investors drives costs of IVC 
transaction costs down for the issuer. 
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9. Benefits, such as preferred dividends, which cannot be enshrined in contracts according 
to IVC rules are obtained informally through alternative tools. Hence, economic payouts 
are the same. 
10. There is currently no correlation between planned exit routes and instruments used in 
IVC contracting. 
11. The risk-return profile of IVC investments is the same as conventional venture capital 
investments’. Ceteris paribus, it is however more conservative in Malaysia or the UAE than 
it is in the US. 
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6. Agency Issues in the Literature 
Following the methodology applied by Ullah (2012), we position our theory within the literature.  
As one of the main causal conditions bringing the form-substance dichotomy at the core of our 
theory and the concepts we have observed, we examine our findings through a short survey of 
the agency literature. We first see how Islamic finance literature treats agency issues, from a 
normative standpoint then from a positive one. Second, we comparatively discuss how financial 
contracting and security design in conventional finance in general, and venture capital in 
particular, are used to manage these agency issues. Finally, we describe some of the factors we 
found to influence various elements of our theory, in their relation to financial contracting and 
agency issues, such as experience of venture capitalists, the legal environment or taxation. 
In the theoretical foundations of Islamic finance, profit loss sharing (PLS) methods of finance are 
preferred. Contracts finding their roots in medieval Islam such as mudaraba, whereby passive 
investors provide equity capital to entrepreneurs, and musharaka, a more active form of 
partnership, are expected to increase the ownership base of society. Both are often likened to 
venture capital and idealized as fair modes of finance where risk and rewards are shared by 
cooperative agents, unlike debt financing presumed to be risk free for the investor and, therefore, 
exploitative. Moreover, agency issues are understated, dismissed or simply ignored by many 
authors as the set of socially centric behavioral assumptions on homo islamicus is expected to 
mitigate them. Sarker (1999) for example suggests incorporating “ignored behavioral 
consideration in the contract” to “induce the agent to behave honestly” and “principal-agent 
problem will be at a minimum magnitude” because “Muslims believe in the eternal concept of life, 
in which honesty is rewardable and dishonesty punishable” and “if all financial operations are 
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based on sharing (…) honest entrepreneurs will force dishonest entrepreneurs out of the market”. 
He also proposes measures typical of venture capital, such as writing contracts that link gradual 
vesting of ownership to performance objectives or improved personal knowledge between 
lenders and borrowers and exploiting geographical proximity to reduce information asymmetries 
and monitoring costs. Khan (1987) shows through a mathematical model the superiority of 
variable return schemes over fixed return schemes, conditional on the absence of informational 
asymmetries. He attributes these asymmetries to dishonesty, and argues that Islamization will 
result in their disappearance. 
Other authors propose theoretical solutions to agency issues. Ahmed (2002) discusses 
underreporting of profits, characterized as dishonesty, as an impediment to profit-sharing modes 
of finance. He recommends an audit based scheme of rewards and penalties to create incentives 
for reporting actual profits. Dar et al. (1998) on the other hand recognize moral hazard and 
propose a theoretical model based on tradeoffs between transaction costs and monitoring costs. 
The model predicts a negative relationship between size, profitability and the use of PLS contracts. 
Dar and Presley (2000) suggest Islamic financial institutions should structure their organization 
along venture capital firms to address the problems arising from lack of control over management. 
In practice, Khalil et al. (2002) indicate that Islamic financial institutions limit their use of 
mudaraba contracts due to their inherent characteristics inducing moral hazard. Possible 
misrepresentation of results by the entrepreneur, uncertainty of returns, and consumption of 
perks are among several concerns of Islamic financial institutions. El-Hawary et al. (2004) also 
briefly discuss the agency issues induced by mudaraba and musharaka within the context of the 
prudential standards that need to be established for Islamic financial institutions. Those contracts 
are used notably in Islamic investment accounts, where a bank is characterized as an entrepreneur 
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and the account holders are characterized as the silent partners. Safieddine (2009) discusses the 
agency issues those investment accounts pose to account holders with limited governance 
recourse. Mirakhor and Zaidi (2007) recommend for concerned lenders that they resort to ijara 
sukuk, or lease-backed securities. Far from the PLS ideals, murabaha or sale based credit, 
functionally equivalent to conventional debt, as well as various types of sukuk, or Islamic bonds, 
are by far the most popular instruments among investors (Farooq, 2007; Iqbal et al., 1998; Khan, 
1995). Accordingly, the actual operating mode of Islamic financial institutions is to replicate 
conventional finance tools (El-Gamal, 2006)34. These studies from the world of banking are 
relevant to this research as the contractual devices used in banking are commonly used in venture 
capital (Triantis, 2001). 
Restrictive religious interpretations in the theoretical framework translate into the existence of a 
sharia board overseeing transactions and contracts as a defining feature of Islamic financial 
institutions.  Theologians sitting on these boards certify the islamicity of their respective 
institutions’ activities and instruments. Arab denominated contracts are designed by specialized 
financial engineers as alternatives to conventional securities, catering to a captive market 
exhibiting behavioral preferences toward an ostensibly distinct Islamic identity (Kuran, 2004). This 
engineering through contracts with sometimes little relation to the original circumstances of their 
creation creates inefficiencies, at the very least in terms of higher transaction costs (El-Gamal, 
                                                          
34 See also El-Gamal (2003). “In an interesting fatwa for HSBC Amana Finance in New York, two active Islamic bank 
jurists signed a document that stated that such language (including the terms "borrower," "interest," and "loan," etc.) 
was only mandated in HSBC documents by New York State, but further noted that the contract was nonetheless 
essentially interest-free.” (footnote p. 124) 
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2006). Farook and Farooq (2011) suggest that the costs of sukuk issuance can be up to 60% higher 
than conventional bonds. 
There is some debate around the incentives of sharia scholars to validate financial products for 
business reasons, regardless of their actual sharia compliance. Farook and Farooq (2011) discuss 
these incentive issues extensively. They mention the network analysis conducted by Funds@work 
which shows that 50 top scholars sit on 73% of all boards, or 834 positions. While this could 
promote the standardization of Sharia rulings, it could also compromise the quality of Sharia 
diligence. They indicate how at least one attempt by AAOIFI to cap the number of sharia boards 
on which scholars can sit, which was met with resistance by scholars. Farook and Farooq (2011) 
explain this using the publicly available anecdotal figures for top sharia scholar fees per sukuk 
issue validations range in the $100K-$300K interval for the Gulf region. Our own interviews reveal 
lower pay rates however for average sharia staff (see footnote 31). 
Although mudaraba and musharaka are implicitly conceived as asset classes by being compared 
to venture capital, they’re mostly used as specific equity based financial instruments by Islamic 
financial institutions. As Islamic finance is bound to face in practice the same agency issues 
conventional finance does (Asutay, 2007), equity financing necessary leads to agency issues 
between entrepreneurs and investors (Farmer and Winter, 1986), or their Islamic alter ego, the 
mudarib and the rab-il-mal respectively. Amit et al (1998) show that a central feature of venture 
capital is its capacity to reduce agency costs and Salhman (1990) explains the setup of venture 
capital funds in relation to agency costs. Whether in conventional or in Islamic finance, projects 
with strong information asymmetries are thus better served by the superior abilities and specific 
organization of venture capitalists to screen and monitor. 
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Cumming and Johan (2009, pp. 32-44) give an overview of agency issues. They describe moral 
hazard, bilateral moral hazard, multitask moral hazard, adverse selection, free riding, hold-up, 
trilateral bargaining, window dressing, underinvestment, asset stripping and risk shifting. There is 
a rich literature on which security is optimal according to circumstances, type of company, and 
type of agency issue. Cumming and Johan (2009, pp. 297-358) examine several securities in this 
context. The proposed correspondence between different agency costs and proposed securities 
is summed up with matching IVC instruments in section 8.1.  
Security design is deeply intertwined with rights allocation in the mitigation of agency costs. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) describe how, because contracts are costly to establish, rights over 
assets can be classified in either specific rights, or residual rights. Residual rights are all those given 
by ownership and not necessarily mentioned in the contract. In this framework of incomplete 
contracts, Aghion and Bolton (1992) propose a theory of capital structure based on control rights. 
The contingent allocation of these based on ex-post observed states of the world ensures 
decisions are taken in ways that reduce agency costs when ex-ante planning is not possible. A 
simple illustration of this is found in debt contracts, which transfer control rights to creditors in a 
state of default, while serving as an ex-ante disciplining measure in states of non-default for 
entrepreneurs valuing control. Berglöf (1994) examines control rights from the perspective of 
exits in venture capital and the trilateral bargaining problems they can generate. The allocation 
of the right to sell mitigates potential collusion with a late coming buyer, the third party, which 
would result in extraction of value at the expense of one of the initial contracting parties. He 
argues that control forms an essential incentive for an entrepreneur and defines a model where 
convertible debt contracts are optimal to preserve that incentive in good states of nature, and 
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protect investors in bad states. Hellmann (1998) discusses how control rights shield investors from 
hold-up issues in states where a change of management is necessary.  
The body of research concerning financial contracting is in fact rich and several surveys are 
available35. It generally deals with how capital structure, the design of securities and the state 
contingent allocation rights respond among others to different problems of agency, including 
adverse selection and information asymmetry, uncertainty as well ownership and control. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) empirically describe and measure these rights in light of existing 
financial contracting theory.  They examine a sample of 213 investments in 119 portfolio 
companies by 14 venture capital firms. Their study confirms theoretical predictions about 
contingent state allocations, but also finds that financial contracting is in reality more complex. 
Indeed, they recognize a continuum of control rights used for contingent contracting, which they 
categorize as cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidations rights and other rights. 
Although agency issues are the main concern behind contractual design, a comprehensive view 
on the venture capital contracts must also take into account a set of factors unrelated to agency. 
One is taxation. Gilson and Schizer (2003) demonstrate how tax practice has had a first-order 
importance in shaping the current prevalence of convertible preferred equity securities in US 
venture capital. They explain how lower investment returns taxation allow management to be 
compensated through a combination of common equity and lower valuations relative to the 
convertible preferred equity issued to venture capitalists. Cumming and Johan (2009, pp. 312-
                                                          
35 See for example Harris and Raviv (1992), Allen and Winton (1995), Hart (2001), or Roberts and Sufi (2009) for surveys 
of the field from different angles. 
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346) presents further evidence in an international setting consistent with this theory, showing a 
negative correlation between tax rates on capital gains and the use of convertible preferred 
equity. Our own interviews suggest that tax matters too, but in a different way. The legal 
uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of untested Islamic financial instruments favors the 
use of simpler structures. 
Another factor is the legal environment. Two competing streams of theory prevail. The first 
stream purports weaker legal enforcement and shareholder protection leads to a shift towards 
other mechanisms of governance. This is illustrated for example by Lerner and Schoar (2005), who 
show that common law countries with stronger law enforcement are more likely to use 
convertible preferred equity, whereas countries with weaker law enforcement, French civil law 
or socialist countries favor a mix of straight debt and/or equity. The analysis points to the 
sophistication of judges and lawyers or their hostility relative to different classes of shares with 
different cash flow and control rights. Investors consequently try to acquire controlling blocks, 
which is inefficient as investors have to increase their investment size, reducing diversification, 
and entrepreneurs’ incentives are diminished. The second stream posits that weaker legal 
enforcement and shareholder protection is compensated by more complex contracts. 
A last factor is experience. Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) discuss how more sophisticated venture 
capitalists focus less on downside protection and more on obtaining board rights. In a nascent 
industry like IVC, our own research suggests venture capitalist experience is a crucial parameter.  
Because IVC addresses the same economic needs as conventional venture capital within an Islamic 
finance framework, the need for conventional-like securities and rights arises, ranging from debt 
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to derivatives as well as for state contingent contracts allocating differently voting, control, board 
and liquidation rights.  
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7. Firm and Fund Governance 
Another element of literature that is relevant to our theory is about governance, and particularly, 
governance of Islamic financial institutions and venture capital firms, since these are at the heart 
of the defining differences between conventional and Islamic firms. Moreover, the contextual 
factors influencing the operations of Islamic venture capital firms explain several aspects of our 
theory. Following the methodology used in Ullah (2012), this section therefore contrasts and 
contextualizes our findings through a quick survey of literature and a description of the 
environment in which IVC operates. 
Salhman (1990) explains how venture capital firms are optimally organized to select the best 
entrepreneurial ventures for investments and minimize agency as well as operating costs. The 
typical firm is organized as a management company dealing with several funds having their own 
legal existence. Funds are raised by these firms with a typical lifespan of ten to twelve years. In 
the first years, the funds are invested in portfolio companies, with three to six years investment 
horizons. The proceeds from these investments are then distributed to the investors. 
7.1. The Investment Process in an Islamic Fund 
In a convention firm, for each portfolio company, investments are staged so as to keep the option 
to discontinue investments. Moreover, mechanisms are kept to force managers to distribute 
returns. The typical investment lifecycle in an entrepreneurial venture goes as follows in a 




Figure 1: Typical investment lifecycle in a conventional venture capital fund 
In contrast, a typical IVC firm has a sharia committee which approves deals as well before initial 






















Figure 2: Typical investment lifecycle in a Islamic venture capital fund 
The order in which investment and sharia committees approve investments vary between firms. 
Sharia audits can also be as simple as submitting a short questionnaire to the company’s 
management or ensuring continuity in line of business and conventional debt ratios according to 
firm guidelines. 
7.2. Regulatory and Environmental Characteristics 
7.2.1. Islamic Financial Standards 
A few international institutions act as standard setters for the Islamic finance industry, with 






























The first one is the Bahrain based Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), which sets accounting, auditing, governance, sharia as well as ethical 
standards for Islamic financial institutions. The second one is the Kuala Lumpur based Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), which sets standards for the supervision of Islamic financial 
institutions and the promotion of their stability. 
7.2.2. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Two institutions regulate Islamic finance generally, and IVC specifically. The first one is the Central 
Bank of Malaysia. Its Sharia Advisory Council acts as a central authority on sharia resolutions and 
issued a compilation of these (Central Bank of Malaysia, 2010). The second one is the Securities 
Commission, whose Sharia Advisory Council acts in the same way, and also issued a compilation 
of its sharia resolutions (Securities Commission of Malaysia, 2007). Both aim at creating some 
consistency across the industry in terms of what is considered sharia compliant and what isn’t. 
Both have an endogenic relationship, together with the IFSB, so harmonization between them is 
straightforward. 
Moreover, they regulate the minimal governance mechanisms in Islamic finance generally, and 
IVC particularly. One of the cornerstone governance rules for IVC firms is the requirement to have 
a board with at least one approved sharia scholar to supervise the firms’ activities. 
Litigation goes through federal courts, as only family law is a state matter. Therefore, federal 
courts play a role in applying Islamic finance jurisprudence. Key regulation includes: 
 the Islamic Banking Act (1983) which  regulates the licensing and operation of Islamic 
banks in Malaysia; 
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 the Takaful Act (1984) which  regulates the licensing and operation of Islamic insurance 
in Malaysia; 
 the Central Bank of Malaysia Act (2009), which mandates that the Central Bank promotes 
Malaysia as an international center of Islamic finance and consecrates the role of the 
Sharia Advisory Council in harmonizing Islamic finance sharia resolutions; 
 and the Guidelines and Best Practices on Islamic Venture Capital (Securities Commission, 
2008), which set the core requirements for Islamic venture capital firms. 
Other details and references on the regulatory framework in Malaysia for IVC can be found in 
Mutalip (2009).  
7.2.3. Dubai, UAE 
Contrary to Malaysia where Islamic finance is a federal matter, the UAE regulates Islamic finance 
at the emirate level. Dubai itself has several free zones with specific regulations. Among these, 
the Dubai International Financial Center is the most active for the financial industry and is where 
DubaiIVCHolding, the Dubai based IVC firm we interviewed, is located. 
The Dubai Financial Services Authority is the regulating authority on financial matters in Dubai. 
One of the key regulations it issued is the DIFC Law No.13 (2004), which specify sharia governance 
requirements, prudential rules and disclosure requirements among others for Islamic financial 
institutions. These are further detailed in the Islamic Finance Rules (2012). Latif (2009) describes 
how Dubai’s Islamic finance regulation focuses on the process of Sharia compliance, that is the 
systemic point of view, such as the existence of, and communication about, supervisory sharia 
board over Islamic Financial Institutions, rather than the outcome of sharia resolutions. 
Dubai has no regulation specific to Islamic venture capital. 
100 
 
7.3. Sharia Governance Considerations 
The choice of the individuals overseeing sharia compliance has an impact on financial contracts. 
In addition to the varying costs and market value of these individuals, more relevant to our study 
is that this choice can determine the shape of the contracts and the amount of constraints placed 
on the management of agency issues. Regardless of whether any given venture capitalist is 
actually driven by religious motives or not, as it only affects the level of sharia compliance being 
sought, a set of factors associated with this choice create risks and opportunities in contract 
formation and implementation. Those factors which we address in the following paragraphs are 
the margin of interpretation in Sharia, the agency configurations between investors and sharia 
supervisors, the limited capacity of sharia scholars in understanding complex financial 
transactions, and the focus on form over substance in much of Islamic financial practice. 
Although institutions such as the AAOIFI or the IFSB try to create standards, there is no single 
unified understanding of Sharia (Ghoul, 2011b). Our own research in IVC confirms this. In addition, 
the processes through which sharia experts reach their religious edicts are non-transparent 
(Farook and Farooq, 2011). Two Islamic investment banks we interviewed illustrate the possible 
discrepancies. The first one, a Malaysian affiliate of a Gulf bank, described how a prospective hotel 
real estate project initially approved by the Sharia scholars on the Malaysian side was 
subsequently invalidated by the Gulf based Sharia scholars at the parent bank. The disagreement 
revolved around the existence of a gender mixed swimming pool described in section 5.1.6. The 
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other second example is the frequent occurrence in a UAE investment bank of disagreements with 
other syndicated banks’ Sharia boards on the terms of issued sukuks36. 
In a topic area where the literature is scant, Ullah (2012) provides an in-depth study of the 
conflicts arising from the pursuit of different objectives by IFIs’ management and their sharia 
departments or sharia supervisory boards. Thus, while the management pursues business 
objectives such as the maximization of shareholders’ value, sharia staff pursues a different set of 
sharia objectives. Ullah (2012) argues that the strength of sharia compliance depends on whether 
shareholders of IFIs are Muslim or whether the IFI is the Islamic window of a convention financial 
institution. The former he says will be more concerned with the sharia compliance of their 
institution’s dealings. Moreover, he brings up, together with other authors such as Farook and 
Farooq (2011) or Rammal (2006) for example, the potential conflict of interest between sharia 
experts’ commitment to sharia compliance and the high compensations some of them receive 
from the institutions for which they provide their certification services and creates an opportunity 
for fatwa-shopping. However, there seems to be at the same time an agreement that this only 
concerns a few individuals. Our own interviews suggest this. First, sharia compliance as an 
institutional function is usually divided between the sharia board and one or more internal sharia 
departments responsible for compliance and audit. The stellar compensation packages only 
concern a small amount of sharia superstars sitting on sharia boards; and the income levels of 
most sharia experts in Malaysia disclosed during our interviews are in average white-collar ranges 
(see footnote 31). Moreover, the institutionalization of internal sharia departments and the 
                                                          
36 Some issues even had to be recalled after they were first approved by a given board, then rejected as non-compliant 
with sharia by other scholars. 
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reputational risk for rank and file employees is high enough to mitigate that phenomenon. The 
IVC industry is less regulated and its supervision is less institutionalized though. In Malaysia, the 
only requirement is to have a sharia supervisory board with one scholar (c.f. section 7.2.2). In the 
UAE, there is no such requirement at all. Additionally, one of the main benefits from a strict 
business point of view of obtaining sharia certification is the legitimacy and economic power they 
provide (Ullah, 2012). In the IVC industry, the incentives for this sharia certification, as well as the 
reputational risks associated with doubtful sharia validation are diminished, though not 
eliminated, due to lower public exposure. As a result, there is much more room in this industry to 
choose business friendly sharia experts. 
Another element in these trade-offs derives from the personal constraints of sharia scholars. 
These constraints manifest themselves in their time availability and the nature of their training 
and experience, limiting their ability to understand complex financial structures (Ullah, 2012). The 
disproportionate concentration of a few high profile scholars at the top of the majority of IFIs 
limits their ability to delve into the details of what they approve (Ünal, 2011). While this 
phenomenon is moderated in the case of IFIs who have internal sharia departments who actually 
prepare the compliance day-to-day activities before hand, or in the case of Malaysia where there 
is a regulatory limit on the number of institutions on which a scholar can be sitting, it provides 
some leeway for Islamic venture capitalists given that IVC firms are less regulated in terms of 
sharia compliance (c.f. section 7.2.2). As is the case with the agency issues arising from the 
business-sharia tensions discussed above, the lower exposure to the public provides the Islamic 




An additional personal constraint is cultural. Particularly relevant to the world of IVC is the 
attitude of sharia scholars towards intangible assets as a basis for Islamic financial transactions 
for example. Currently, they are essentially prohibited. We found only two papers discussing the 
acceptability of intangible assets in Islamic finance. The first one reports how a 
telecommunication company obtained Islamic approval for using airtime as a base asset (Utting, 
2007). The second paper (Ngadimon, 2008) is authored by a sharia specialist from the Malaysia 
Securities Commission arguing in favor of their permissibility by exposing different Sunni views on 
intangible assets, and goodwill in particular. Along these lines, although the majority of IVC firms 
we’ve met focus on innovative companies, their transactions are tied, at least formally, to tangible 
assets. Yet, venture capitalists are best at managing agency issues, which are more pronounced 
when investments require higher specialization, are based on intangible assets and have high 
growth prospects (Gompers, 1995). This attitude could be rooted in Middle-Eastern practices 
where trade is still traditionally based, with the concept of trading in companies not culturally 
ingrained yet (Bolton, 2011). 
The reputational cost however of validating contracts not reaching a minimum level of sharia 
acceptability is perceived to be high (Ghoul, 2011a; Ullah, 2012; see also sections 0 and 0). 
Additional potential costs include the ability to cancel entire investments if the sharia certification 
is later revoked (Garas and Pierce, 2010) and hand over corresponding profits to charity37. In some 
of the IVC firms we interviewed, sharia supervisors have an ex-post power to force an exit if the 
transaction is retroactively considered non sharia compliant or the investee company have moved 
                                                          
37 The concept of “cleansing returns” is discussed by El-Gamal (2006, pp. 133-134) for mutual funds and public stock. 
The IVC managers we’ve met also have to go through cleansing if gains are deemed illegitimate by their sharia scholars. 
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outside sharia compliance parameters. That prerogative has not been exercised in any of the cases 
we have met though. 
One more factor influencing the form of contracts is the focus of Islamic finance on form over 
substance. We found this to be the central theme of this research. It is in most cases possible to 
re-engineer conventional financial instruments through contracts from classical jurisprudence (El-
Gamal, 2006). Chong and Liu (2009) find evidence that in practice, Islamic banks’ dealings are not 
fundamentally different from their conventional equivalents. In contrast with existing practice 
however, which may add to legal uncertainty, Bank Negara Malaysia’s official position on the 
“substance over form” principle is that in case of conflict between substance and form, it is 
ultimately substance that should prevail38. Our interviews also suggest Islamic finance is more 
associated with the spiritual side of engaging with people sharing the same values than material 
differences in the underlying economics. DubaiIVCHolding’s head of investments for example 
insisted the spiritual difference was more important than the economics of the transactions. This 
suggests that the conflict between business objectives and sharia objectives can be mitigated 
                                                          
38 Central Bank of Malaysia (2010), p. 192, in its sharia resolution issued in the context of the “substance over form” 
reporting principle in accounting and financial statements declares: 
The SAC, in its 57th meeting dated 30 March 2006 and 71st meeting dated 26 - 27 October 2007, has resolved 
that in principle, “substance” and “form” are equally important and highly taken into consideration by the 
Shariah. In this regard, the Shariah emphasises that “substance” and “form” must be consistent and shall not 
contradict one another. In the event of inconsistency between “substance” and “form” due to certain factors, 
the Shariah places greater importance on “substance” rather than “form”. 
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through a focus by Islamic venture capitalists on engineering in formally acceptable terms what 




8. Financial Instruments and Security Design 
8.1. Response to Agency Issues 
Cumming and Johan (2009) enumerated typical agency issues found in conventional venture 
capital and suggested solutions to many of them. Likewise, Feld & Mendelson (2011) and 
Wilmerding (2001) listed the different control rights typical in conventional venture capital term 
sheets and contracts. These agency issues, and the corresponding responses, are summarized in 
Figure 3. The definitions for the different control rights can be found in our interview guideline, 
in Appendix 10.2. Since this study relies on the perspective of the venture capitalist as the 
principal and the entrepreneur as the agent, our descriptions are limited to this specific agency 
relationship. 
Moral hazard happens when the returns to efforts of the entrepreneur are not fully returned to 
him or when the costs of private consumption by the entrepreneur are not fully borne by him, 
such as in the case of equity partnerships. Multitask moral hazard are a specific case, where the 
entrepreneur undertakes several activities, some of which will not benefit the investors. Asset 
stripping is another situation resulting from information asymmetries on the state of the 
company, when entrepreneurs reduce the value of the company through actions that, as its name 
indicates, strip it from its assets. 
Adverse selection, first described by Akerlof (1970), refers, in our context, to how different 
contracts attract different entrepreneurs. Ceteris paribus, a debt offer will attract riskier 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, for the same expected return, a riskier entrepreneur has a higher 
probability of achieving a very successful scenario whose profits he wouldn’t share by issuing 
debt. The higher probability of failure also makes the venture capitalist bear the losses in case of 
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bankruptcy. On the other hand, en equity offer will attract ceteris paribus entrepreneurs with 
lower expected returns. In their case, the expected cost of giving up equity is lower for the same 
risk. 
A hold-up happens when the entrepreneur has the power to expropriate the venture capitalist as 
a result of unbalanced bargaining power. This could happen when, for example, an entrepreneur 
who is a vital resource to the funded project threatens to leave. Trilateral bargaining is a situation 
where the entrepreneur negotiates the sale of company stakes to a third party, in terms that are 
not in the interest of the venture capitalists. Window dressing refers to entrepreneur make their 
companies look better than what they actually are. Underinvestment is the situation where 
incentives are not sufficient for the entrepreneur to exert the necessary effort to make a project 
succeed. Cumming and Johan (2009) illustrate this situation in a scenario of bankruptcy, where a 
project can move the company from a state A to a state B, both of which are in bankruptcy, 
although B has better payouts to the venture capitalists than A. Risk shift is another agency issue, 
where entrepreneurs shift the risk profile of the company after venture capitalists have entered 
the business. 
To manage these agencies, conventional venture capitalists use an array of securities and 
contractual rights. Interestingly, the personal put options acquired from entrepreneurs seem to 
be a Malaysian idiosyncrasy, which is why the literature may not have been interested in it yet. 
The reliance on a company’s institutionalization, a characteristic we found in Dubai, is similar to 
the one found in later stage investing or private equity. The tools used in IVC are the same, with 
some restrictions. First, financial instruments are Islamicized. A full comparison between 
convention and Islamic instruments payoffs used in venture capital is given in the following 
section. Second, clauses like Legal Fees and Expenses which oblige the entrepreneur to bear the 
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costs of broken negotiations before a deal is close are limited in IVC to tangible costs, whereas in 
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Risk shifting  Personal Put option / 
Institutionalization 
Cumming and Johan (2009): 
 Provide equity 
Feld & Mendelson (2011) and Wilmerding 
(2001): 
 Protective Clause 
 Personal Put option / 
Institutionalization 
 Protective Clause 
Figure 3: VC-Entrepreneur Agency and Typical Response 
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8.2. Comparison between Conventional and IVC Instruments 
8.2.1. Straight Debt 
There are several types of contracts for debt in Islamic finance. The two we have met in the 
context of IVC are murabaha and sukuk. The former is a trade based loan, the latter is a bond. 
Regular murabaha consists in a lender buying a property from a seller and reselling it to the buyer. 
The buyer then repays the lender according to a regular amortization calendar. Sharia scholars 
accept this transaction as valid since it is considered a sale with differed payment, not an interest 
based loan. Like most Islamic finance contractual forms, there is variation in the way murabaha is 
implemented. For example, not all murabaha transactions are secured. We have seen, in the case 
of MalaysiaIIVC, how the object of sale is used as collateral to obtain a regular bank credit, giving 
the bank priority of claims and making it effectively unsecured. In some jurisdictions, the double 
sale involved in murabaha implies double taxation, making transaction costs higher. Ignoring 
transaction costs, the payouts are otherwise the same for regular loans and murabaha, both 




Figure 4: payouts: secured loan vs. regular murabaha 
 
 
Figure 5: payouts: unsecured loan vs. unsecured murabaha 
Sukuk, as debt instruments, have the same economic payouts as above. They are structured to 
behave like bonds. As with murabaha, sukuk are theoretically based on underlying transactions 
on real assets. For example, the most common sukuk structure, sukuk ijara, is based on a sale-
and-leaseback transaction. Like murabaha, it can be unsecured by unlinking explicitly the 
underlying asset from the cash flows. It can be stated explicitly for example that the lending is 
unsecured and the agreed upon payments must be made regardless of the existence of the asset, 
such as a case where it would be destroyed39. 
                                                          
39 As an illustration, see El-Gamal (2006), pp. 107-113, for a full discussion of such a sukuk ijara issued by Qatar in 2003. 
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8.2.2. Common Equity 
Common equity is characterized by Islamic finance jurists as the ownership of underlying assets 
of the company by individual shareholders, based on the classical concept of mudaraba. Different 
classes of shares however are seen by contemporary Islamic finance jurists outside Malaysia as a 
violation of the principle of fairness. According to them, two persons paying the same price for a 
share should receive the same share of profit. Moreover, rights are not considered valid objects 
of sale. 
In venture capital, different classes of shares are used mostly in staged financing or to manage 
exits. They matter especially for their attached liquidation, pay-to-play and anti-dilution rights. 
Interestingly, in our interviews, we have seen these rights used as part of the shareholders’ 
agreements even without the formal existence of different classes of shares, rendering the 
prohibition of different classes purely conceptual. Therefore, the common equity securities used 
are the same in conventional venture capital as in IVC, resulting in the same payouts. 
8.2.3. Preferred Equity 
As mentioned in the previous section, different classes of shares with different payouts are not 
accepted in Islamic finance. MalaysiaIIVC has been using the MRCI in lieu of convertible preferred 
equity. Thus, we will use the MRCI security as a reference against preferred equity, ignoring its 




Figure 6: payout of a preferred share 
Ps is the par value of the preferred shares. dps is the return of the preferred shares. 
Now, let C be the cost of acquisition of object of sale in the case of the MRCI, p the profit of the 
murabaha transaction. Let d be the expected dividend gifts. 
 
Figure 7: payout of the MRCI, ignoring its convertibility feature. 
Ignoring convertibility, the MRCI reproduces the behavior of a preferred share by setting C=Ps and 
dps=p+d, with two slight differences. Bankruptcy can be forced by the MRCI holder if returns are 
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below p. Moreover, if the cost of not honoring the expected dividend gifts is lower for the 
entrepreneur than d, then the payout of the MRCI becomes p for the venture capitalist outside of 
states of bankruptcy. There is therefore a theoretical price for this inefficiency, relative to the 
exact behavior of a preferred share, that could be priced in depending on who would bear it.  
8.2.4. Convertible Preferred Equity 
The convertibility of preferred equity impacts its payouts at higher values of the company. The 
same goes with MRCI. Compared to last section, the new payout functions become: 
 




Figure 9: payout for the MRCI 
In the case of the preferred shares, the conversion is exercised when the value of the company 
reaches v. This same value in the case of the MRCI is represented by v2. Like in the previous 
section, the MRCI has an additional state though, represented by the brown line, which is when 
the entrepreneur’s cost of not honoring the expected dividend gifts is lower than d. In that state, 
the value v1 at which the conversion option is exercised is lower than v2. 
8.2.5. Convertible Debt 
Convertible debt is economically equivalent to the MRCI without the expected dividend gifts. Let’s 
assume an IVC investment based on an MRCI instrument with an understanding that no dividend 
gift will be granted. Assuming unsecured MRCI and debt, the payouts for the convertible debt and 




Figure 10: payouts of convertible debt vs. MRCI without expected dividend gifts 
8.2.6. Options and Warrants 
Options have been prohibited by contemporary Islamic finance jurists on the basis of gharar, the 
uncertainty surrounding objects of sale and their terms. Classical Islamic jurisprudence however 
have contracts such as the urbun40, or downpayment with no obligation on the buyer to proceed 
with the purchase, and salam, or forward sale of fungible goods, both of which are accepted by 
contemporary Islamic finance jurists and used to synthesize derivatives. We will use the simplest 
of the two structures, the urbun, against call options to illustrate the economic equivalence 
between IVC and conventional venture capital in this case. Warrants differ from call options in 
that they have a dilutive characteristic for the payout. 
Let K be the strike price of a call option and c its value. 
                                                          
40 See El-Gamal (2006), pp. 91-96 for a more complete discussion of the use of urbun contracts as option instruments. 
120 
 
Let d be the downpayment for a urbun contract, and P the price of its object of sale. The economic 
behavior of the call option is reproduced by setting d=c and P=K+c. The payout function is 
therefore: 
 
Figure 11: payout of a call option vs. urbun 
When the company value is below K the conventional venture capitalist loses c, the Islamic 
venture capitalist loses d. When the company value is at K, the call option is exercised. Likewise, 
then the value of the company is equal to the purchase price P set for the urbun contract minus 
the down payment d, the venture capitalist proceeds with the purchase. Break-even is reached in 






Through our Grounded Theory research methodology, we explored the determinants of financial 
contracting in the world of IVC. We found that most findings in conventional venture capital apply 
as well to IVC, as the two are economically near-equivalents. Several of our hypotheses could be 
later tested quantitatively, provided data becomes available. However, given the size of the 
industry and its early age, by the time such quantitative data becomes available, the industry itself 




10. Appendix: Interview Guideline 
10.1. Questions 
10.1.1. Malaysia specifics 
 Under Federal Constitution, Islamic law is a matter falling within State list. How does it 
reconcile with the Central Bank’s SAC mandate? Can a state challenge its authority when it 
comes to SAC resolutions? 
 Where are legal challenges settled? 
10.1.2. Context of LP Contracts and Fund Covenants 
 Are there Islamic Finance (IF) related restrictive covenants regarding the authority of the fund 
manager (FM) regarding investment decisions? Does the FM have to refer to a sharia board 
for example? E.g. Restrictions on the FM’s investment powers, on the FM’s co-investment of 
personal funds? 
 Are there covenants relating to the types of investment? E.g. type of portfolio company, 
industry, etc. 
 Are there covenants relating to the fund’s operations? On the FM’s extra-fund activities? 
 Is the liability – or the limitations thereof – of the FM different in IF? 
 Are there IF-specific limitations on who gets to participate as an LP? Do IPEVC funds syndicate 
with non IPEVC funds? 
 Are the covenants adapted to institutional and legal factors (e.g. LP contracts in KSA vs. the 
UK, would they require different covenants to be deemed Islamic)? Is there a preference for 
the law of contracting (e.g. create offshore funds in IF friendly legal systems)? 
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 What are the differences, if any, between institutional investors regarding attitudes and 
requirements relative to IF contracts and covenants? 
 Is priority of claims tolerated in Islamic PE/VC (IPEVC)? If not, how are agency problems/moral 
hazard between syndicating VCs, VCs and entrepreneurs, VCs and LPs managed? 
10.1.3. On Sharia Expert Role, Hiring and Compensation 
 How is a typical Sharia Compliance (SC) department organized? What are the 
operational/other processes? 
 How is a SE selected/hired? What’s the process? Is there a typical job description? Is it through 
contacts? Does reputation play a role? Is there a formal process to screen potential 
candidates? 
 Is it easy to find Sharia experts? Are there enough graduates? Experienced professionals? 
 How is SE compensation made? In comparison to other conventional positions (directors, 
compliance officers, lawyers)? 
 How do they compare in terms of performance compensation? Is SE compensation linked to 
performance? How is SE performance measured? 
 What is the structure of compensation and pay structure in IF?  
 Which part is due to differences in legal conditions (emerging markets, weaker law 
enforcement, reliability of performance measurability, etc., leading to higher fixed fees for 
example)? 
 What role, if any, does market captivity play on compensation? 
 What other role does the SE play in terms of linkage with their environment? Government 
institutions? Other financial institutions? Other actors? 
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 How similar is your financial institution’s SC organization to other institutions? Which part is 
the result of regulatory constraints or other external factors, and which part is specific to your 
institution? 
 What do you consider to be particularly important for the credibility of SEs and SC 
departments? Among professionals? Among consumers? Among investors? 
 How does the pressure to compete with conventional banking translate in your everyday 
operations? 
 Is there a professional association for SEs? 
 What is with the diversity of interpretations and fatwas on same issues? 
 What is the typical composition of a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB)? Yours specifically? Its 
terms of reference? What decision making powers does it have? Who has power of 
appointment and dismissal on the SSB or the SC departments? Who controls SC/SSB fit and 
develops proper criteria for it? 
 Who do the SEs report to? The SC department reports to whom? 
 Pros and cons of SEs sitting on only one or several SSBs? 
10.1.4. On Sharia Operations 
 Do you have any Sharia audit/review unit? What are its terms of reference? What are the 
systems of control and assessment? 
 What is the Islamic product development process? How is it organized in terms of unit? When 
are the SEs involved? 
10.1.5. Differences Between Conventional Finance (CF) and IF funds 
 How do IF funds usually structure? (LP, corp., etc.) 
 Who do they raise from? 
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 Are the information asymmetries stronger in the case of IF funds (e.g. lack of investor 
education, new/captive market, lack of finance background of even wealthy investors, etc.) 
 Are there constraints on investment exits? (e.g. not sell to certain entities, investor types, 
anything else?) 
 How is the quality certification usually provided by PEVC firms at exits perceived in the context 
of IPEVC investments? 
 According to Abraaj, control is sought to ensure continuous sharia compliance. Isn’t this 
rather a characteristic of emerging markets investments? 
 How do IPEVC funds compete with non IPEVC funds – additional research costs and additional 
specialized skills required? What is the premium, if any, charged compared to similar 
conventional funds? 
 One of the main benefits of traditional PEVC is the added value in terms of company selection 
capacity, agency reduction, innovation, commercial networks and operational efficiencies. 
What is the value proposition for IF investors compared to these? 
 How are IPEVC investments in a portfolio company valued and reported? What methods are 
used? 
10.1.6. IPEVC Funds/Firms, Industry, Regulatory and Environmental 
Characteristics 
 Are there different types of IPEVC funds (e.g. CVC, IVC, GVC...)? Which markets do they cater 
to, in terms of institutional investors? In terms of portfolio companies? 
 What are the factors that increase supply or demand for IPEVC? 
 What are the geographical areas which are the most active/attractive for IPEVC investors? 
IPEVC investments? Is there any home bias in this? 
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 Is there a typical allocation to IF funds from institutional investors? Do regulatory 
environments play a role? What about perceived legal or cultural environments? Policies? 
Bureaucratic red tape? Specifically, taxation or securities regulations? 
 Are there direct government investment programs (e.g. SWF) promoting IPEVC? 
 Is there a typical allocation of IF funds in investments? 
 What are the benefits/drawbacks associated with investing in an IF fund for an institutional 
investor? 
 What are the disclosure standards/regulations/practices? How influential are the regulatory 
bodies such as the IFSB? Local regulations? Benefits of standard bodies or standardization of 
regulations? 
 Are there organizational characteristics among institutional investors which would favour 
IPEVC allocations? 
 Correlation between IPEVC industry and capital markets? 
10.1.7. Financial Contracting and Security Design 
 Do IF funds use debt instruments (or functionally equivalent instruments)? Preferred Equity 
or economically equivalent instruments? 
 How are agency problems and moral hazard mitigated through IF instruments, if at all? 
 Aside from compliance to sharia, which other objectives does the design of IPEVC securities 
try to achieve? 
 Different designs attract different types of entrepreneurs in conventional investments. As 
such, it manages not only agency and moral hazard issues, it also deals with adverse selection 
problems. How is this reflected in IPEVC? 
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 What are the constraints and costs of IF instruments compared to functionally equivalent 
conventional ones in the case in IPEVC? 
 How are control, decision, veto, and cash flow rights distributed? How are priorities of claims 
managed? 
 What are the sharia resolutions on contracting based on contingencies (see classification as 
per Kaplan and Strömberg, 2000) of 1) financial measures performance 2) non-financial 
measure of performance (e.g. new product version, patent approval, etc.) 3) meeting dividend 
4) certain actions being taken 5) offering of securities (e.g. IPO) 6) founder staying with the 
firm? 
 Is the design of securities also used to compensate for weak law enforcement issues? 
 What are the main securities used in IPEVC?  
 Are pre-planned exists taken into account in the design of IPEVC securities? 
 Does IF security design impose restrictions/costs sometimes on how you can exit an 
investments? Is there some related restructuring done sometimes? 
 Which types of IF securities are associated with which types of exits? 
 One of the ways FM obtain downside protection and upside incentives for themselves is 
through convertible securities. How is this done in IPEVC where debt instruments are formally 
excluded? 
10.2. Checklist of Common Contractual Rights and Securities 








Preferential claim up to a certain amount on proceeds in case of 
liquidity event. 
   
Pay-to-Play 
Forces other investors to co-finance at their pro-rata of shares or 
have their preferred shares (and associated rights) converted into 
common. 
   
Vesting 
Employees/Managers of investee company gain ownership of their 
shares progressively with time. 
   
Employee Pool 
Amount of the company reserved for future issuance to employees. 
   
Antidilution 
Prior investments are revalued in case new equity is issued at lower 
price. 
   
Board of Directors 
Presence on the board of directors. 
   
Protective/Reservation Provisions 
Veto rights on certain actions/decisions of the company. 
   
Drag-Along    
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Right to force sale or liquidation of company if majority of preferred 
shareholders agree to it. 
Conversion 
Right to convert preferred stock into common. 
   
Redemption 
Right to force company to pay back investment. 
   
Put Option 
Right to sell VC shares to the entrepreneurs. 
   
Legal Fees and Expenses 
VCs expenses leading to investment are covered by the investee 
company. 
   
Information Rights 
Access to company information by investors. 
   
Right of First Refusal 
Priority of participation in event of new equity issue. 
   
Special Voting Rights 
Different voting rights, or different classes with same voting rights, 
etc. 
   
Restriction on Sales 
Right of first refusal on existing equity. 
   
Proprietary Information and Inventions 
Ensures intellectual property of the company is continuously 
protected and owned by it. 




If entrepreneurs sell shares, investors have a right to sell it along. 
   
Restrictions on Founders’ Activities 
Entrepreneurs have an obligation to devote their full time to the 
investee company. 
   
IPO Shares Purchase 
Right to purchase at preferential price a certain amount of equity 
issued in the event of an IPO. 
   
No-Shop 
Entrepreneurs can’t seek other investors anymore while a deal is 
being closed. 
   
Indemnification 
Investee company agrees to indemnify investors for any claims by 
third party. 
   
Use of Preferred Shares    
Use of Different Classes of Shares 
Please Describe. 
   
Use of Debt 
Or debt-like instruments such as murabaha 
   
Use of Convertibility Options in Issued Securities 
Please describe. 
   
Valuation Issues 
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